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This book is published in homage to Tommaso 
Padoa-Schioppa, president of Notre Europe from 
2005, who was associated with our project since the 
outset. His sudden death, on 18 December 2010, is a 
great loss for Europe. He was also a highly 
respected figure in international monetary policy-
making and financial reform. Among the numerous 
and prestigious  positions that Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa held during his life are those of member 
of the European Central Bank’s first executive 
board (1998-2005), Italian Minister for economy and 
finance (2006-2008) and chairman of the International Monetary and 
Financial Committee at the IMF (2007-2008). A great European, Tommaso 
Padoa-Schioppa was one of the founding fathers of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). A few days before his death, in an interview with 
Notre Europe, he emphasized the need to reform the system for financing 
the EU. His words could have served as an introduction to this paper:  
An increase in the EU budget today is perceived as a subtraction of 
resources from the national budgets. And indeed, in accounting terms, 
this is the case because revenues accrue to the EU budget from 
national budgets. This state of affairs, however, is not inevitable. It is 
an unfortunate consequence of the lack of autonomy that member 
states have imposed upon the EU budget. It would be much more 
appropriate – and consistent with sound principles of fiscal federalism 
– if the EU budget was financed with genuine own resources, going 
from the taxpayer to the EU, without transiting through national 
budgets. 
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Interview with Notre Europe 
 “Conversation on the eve of the 2010 European December Council” 
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he budget of the European Union amounts to around 1% of the EU 
gross national income (GNI), a size that has remained modest and 
stable over the last decade, even though the scope of its activities has 
grown ever wider during the same period. For 2011, it is set at €126.5 
billion in payments (€141 billion in commitments). 
And yet, year after year, the negotiation of the annual budget by the 
two arms of the budgetary authority proves to be extremely difficult. Every 
year, during the budgetary procedure, the Council adopts an accountant-
like approach and makes horizontal cuts to the draft budget proposed by 
the Commission, thus contesting the very financial programming it agreed 
to when setting the multiannual financial framework.  
Even more strangely, this does not dissuade the European Council 
from making public commitments, with potential additional financial 
implications. But when the time comes to implement them, these promises 
fail to receive the necessary financial backing from the same member states. 
For instance, the Treaty of Lisbon gives the European Union 
competences for new policies such as energy, space, the fight against 
climate change. This Treaty entered into force in December 2009, but these 
new competences have not yet received a budgetary response. The latest 
decision of the European Council with a tangible financial impact is the EU 
2020 strategy, which aims at providing the EU with a new growth strategy 
for the coming decade to help it become a smart, sustainable and inclusive 
economy. Decided in 2010, this strategy has not yet received a single euro! 
One might think that the negotiation of the next financial framework 
would, on the basis of a clear assessment of its needs, enable the EU to be 
provided with more realistic resources for the future, but nothing is less 
sure. Indeed, five Heads of State and Government sent a letter to the 
President of the European Commission, in which they requested the 
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freezing of the budget in the next multiannual financial framework, stating 
that Europe is currently experiencing a period of severe austerity and that 
national budgets are under great constraint. 
The real problem of the European budget is in fact the structure of its 
resources. Today, the EU budget is predominantly financed by national 
contributions, which, at the outset, was not the initial purpose of the 
European Economic Community (EEC), the precursor to the EU. Indeed, 
when the European Communities were first established, the GNI resource 
was supposed to be transitional. However, while fully replaced in 1970 by 
genuine own resources – agricultural and import duties – national 
contributions were reintroduced in 1988 in order to complement a decrease 
in the own resource revenue, a budgetary deficit being prohibited by the 
Treaty. But what was supposed to be a transitional solution was prolonged 
and even reinforced over the years and, as a consequence, the European 
Union has progressively lost its financial autonomy. 
The greater the share of the GNI contribution is, the more member 
states conceive of it as a transfer from their national treasury to Brussels, 
rather than as an own resource of the European Union, and the more 
importance they attach to what they get in return. Financed at almost 75% 
by contributions coming from national treasuries, which are today 
experiencing severe deficits given the current economic crisis, it is not a 
surprise that member states have difficulties in respecting their financial 
commitment to the European Union. 
The opposition between net contributors and net receivers and the 
increasing emphasis on the concept of fair return has, step by step, 
transformed the multiannual financial framework negotiations into a 
confrontation of different national claims, resulting in various rebates and 
compensations, of which the Council agreement on the current multiannual 
financial framework (2007-2013) is the point of culmination. And every 
year, during the annual budgetary procedure, the Council comes again 
with an accounting approach. 
Last but not least, the extreme complexity of the system and the 
damaging lack of transparency, which results from it, render the system 
totally incomprehensible to the European citizen, who, in the end, is the 
main loser in such a system. Indeed, the presentation in the Official Journal 
is of no less than nine pages of indigestible calculations, in order to 
translate into legislation the alchemist's recipe elaborated by the member 
states, behind closed doors, and composed of various rebates, EUROPE FOR GROWTH | 3 
compensations or exemptions! And, on top of this, contrary to what is the 
common rule in any democratic body, the European Parliament, while 
directly elected by European citizens, has no say in the decisions on EU 
resources: according to the Treaty, the European Parliament and the 
Council of Ministers share the budgetary power ... but only as regards 
spending.  
For all these reasons, the financing system of the European Union is 
today on its last legs. A radical change of its orientation is necessary if we 
want the EU budget to be reconciled with the solidarity role it should play, 
to prepare the ground for a strong economic recovery as well as to give the 
EU the means to properly address future challenges. 
Fully funding the European Union with independent sources of 
revenue is the only way to put an end to the fair return approach. This will 
then make the necessary change to its spending possible in order to 
provide the EU with adequate means to meet its needs. This is the key for 
the success of the EU 2020 strategy.  
Such a radical change is possible. In fact it is a question of political 
will. This is what we aim to demonstrate in this paper. After an historical 
review of the evolution of the European financing system (chapter 1), we 
explain in detail its current extreme complexity, unfairness and lack of 
transparency (chapter 2). Against this background, we then present the 
three components of the reform that we propose to bring to EU financing: 
first a radical change to the system of own resources (chapter 3), second the 
creation of European project bonds to finance investments for huge 
European infrastructures (chapter 4), and thirdly more synergies and 
rationality in the budget as it stands today, economies of scale being a non-




1.  HISTORY OF THE SYSTEM OF COMMUNITY 
OWN RESOURCES:  HOW DID THE EU 
BUDGET LOSE ITS FINANCIAL AUTONOMY?1 
1.1  1957-1970: From a system based on national contributions to 
the emergence of own resources 
From the European Coal and Steel Community to the European Economic 
Community 
The Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), set up in 1951, was financed by 
means of levies on coal and steel production which were paid directly to 
the ECSC without passing via national budgets, as ECSC own resources. 
When the European Economic Community (EEC) replaced the ECSC 
in 1957, it was concerned not with any specific product but with the 
economy as a whole. Unlike the ECSC, the EEC did not initially have any 
own resources. However, an aspiration to financial autonomy existed from 
the outset, as expressed in Article 201 of the Treaty of Rome: 
The Commission shall examine the conditions under which the 
financial contributions of member states provided for in Article 200 
could be replaced by the Community’s own resources, in particular by 
revenue accruing from the common customs tariff, when it has been 
finally introduced. To this end, the Commission shall submit 
proposals to the Council….  
In its early days the EEC was therefore financed by levies or 
contributions from the budgets of the member states. It would therefore be 
                                                      
1 T h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  b a s e d  o n  a  n o t e  w r itten by Dr. Harry Notenboom, entitled 
"Opbouw en afbraak van het stelsel van Eigen Middelen van de Europese Unie", 
Venlo, 2009. EUROPE FOR GROWTH | 5  
necessary to develop the own resources system step by step, as it became 
possible to achieve unanimity on the proposals made. 
Although customs levies were mentioned in the Treaty of Rome, it 
was agricultural levies that constituted the first own resource of the EEC, 
from 1962,2 the year in which the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was 
established. The CAP transferred the bulk of the national agricultural 
policies of the six member states to the EEC, with the corollary that the 
corresponding expenditure was removed from national budgets. In part, 
the CAP was financed on the basis of revenue from levies on imports into 
the member states of certain agricultural products from third countries. It 
was the levy on imports of agricultural products which was transferred to 
the EEC budget.  
However, as agricultural levies were not sufficient to finance the 
Community, financial contributions from the member states continued to 
exist in parallel. 
The ‘empty chair’ crisis and its resolution 
The financial autonomy of the Communities, and hence the cessation of 
annual financial dependence on the member states, was always an objective 
pursued by the European Commission and the European Parliament. One 
corollary of this financial autonomy thanks to own resources was a 
parliament elected by direct universal suffrage, enabling those voters – 
European citizens – who wished to observe the use being made of the 
funds, which they were paying directly to the European Community, to 
exert influence over the financing of European policies. It was in this spirit 
that in 1965 the European Commission formulated joint proposals on the 
financing of the CAP, the EEC’s own resources and expanding Parliament’s 
powers. These proposals met with strong opposition from France, which 
saw the CAP as catering for its interests. 
In token of its disagreement, France decided in 1965 to pursue an 
‘empty chair’ policy at the Council of Ministers. The only way of resolving 
this crisis was by adopting the Luxembourg compromise in 1966. This 
compromise was neither more nor less than an agreement to disagree, 
which would in future compel the Council of Ministers to take its decisions 
unanimously, even in cases where the Treaty provided for majority voting.  
                                                      
2 Council regulation of 4 April 1962 regarding the financing of the Common 
Agricultural Policy, Official Journal of the European Communities No. 30, 
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It was only at a conference of Heads of State and Government (the 
future European Council) on 1 and 2 December 1969 that it proved possible 
to achieve a breakthrough to overcome the budgetary deadlock, thanks to 
the pressure constantly exerted by the European Parliament on the 
Commission and Council, with the support of national parliaments. This 
breakthrough led to the Treaty of Luxembourg of 21 April 1970, amending 
the Treaty of Rome and the Treaty merging the Community institutions. 
This treaty amending the Treaty of Rome expanded the European 
Parliament’s budgetary powers considerably. At this Council, the member 
states also took a ‘Decision on the replacement of financial contributions 
from member states by the Communities’ own resources’.3 This decision 
formally identified as such the Community’s own resources: customs 
duties and agricultural levies, as well as a third own resource comprising 
an annually adjusted percentage of the harmonised VAT base. This 
decision entailed the abolition of contributions from the budgets of the 
member states and resulted in financial autonomy for the Community. 
This first decision on own resources was of such importance, as well 
as forming such a vital part of the ‘institutional framework’ of the 
Community, that it required the approval of the parliaments of all the 
member states.  
1.2  1970-1988: The own resources system increasingly questioned 
How the VAT resource was diverted from its initial objective 
The gradual establishment of the VAT resource  
The decision of 1970 defined the VAT resource as follows: ‘revenues 
accruing from value added tax (VAT), obtained by applying a rate not 
exceeding 1% to an assessment basis to be determined in a uniform manner 
for member states according to Community rules’. 
In order to ensure the proper functioning of this system, a high 
degree of harmonisation was required. It was with this aim in mind that 
the ‘Sixth VAT Directive’, concerning the harmonisation of the tax base, 
was adopted.  
                                                      
3 Council decision of 21 April 1970 on the replacement of financial contributions 
from Member States by the Communities’ own resource, OJ L N°94, 28.04.1970. EUROPE FOR GROWTH | 7  
The total expenditure provided for in the budget now had to be 
financed from the three own resources. Agricultural levies and import 
duties could be estimated (and were calculated in retrospect on the basis of 
the revenue actually levied). The VAT resource then had to cover the 
remainder, as the European Community was not allowed to run a deficit. 
The percentage could be determined on the basis of an estimate of the 
added value generated in the member states. If this percentage was for 
example set at 0.75%, which figure was then adopted by the President of 
Parliament, the amounts obtained by applying this percentage of the tax 
base were allocated to the European Community. Insofar as the member 
states were free (within certain limits established by the VAT Directive) to 
set the rates, the revenue was allocated as follows: if the rate was 19%, 
0.75% of the value of the product or service subject to VAT was allocated to 
the EEC and 18.25% to the budget of the member state concerned. The 
European share was independent of the setting of the rate, which remained 
a matter for decision at national level. 
The principle of the national and European shares of VAT once 
having been established, it was then necessary to put this allocation into 
practice. In order to do so the European Commission proposed two 
methods: the declaration method and the statistical method. 
Under the declaration method, any receipt/invoice made out had to 
indicate the two percentages, the national percentage and the European 
percentage. The addition and subtraction of all of these returns then led to 
the two totals: the national share and the share to be transferred to the 
Community. The consumer could see, on every invoice, precisely how 
much VAT was being paid to the national treasury and how much to 
Europe. This was certainly the most precise method, and was also the 
method preferred by the European Commission. The amount of 
administration it entailed, however, was enormous, in a period when 
computerisation was still in its infancy, and this acted as a brake on its 
implementation. 
According to the statistical approach, the European portion of the 
VAT was determined by applying the European percentage (different each 
year, depending on the budget) to the total value of the goods and services 
consumed, as obtained according to statistical methods. 
The Council of Ministers decided, for the time being, to leave the 
member states free to choose between the two methods, but ultimately only 
the statistical method was applied. 8 | HISTORY OF THE SYSTEM OF COMMUNITY OWN RESOURCES 
 
The transitional period for the introduction of the VAT resource had 
to be extended several times, and it was 1980 before the resources flowed 
into the budget from all member states in the form of a percentage of the 
uniform VAT base, as a third own resource. 
Decision by the member states to collect European levies 
The member states were responsible for collecting and transferring levies to 
the European Commission.4 The collection costs were estimated at an 
average of 5%, yet the Commission returned 10% to the member states in 
the event that the transfers had been executed correctly. This approach 
meant that the individual member states each still had a minimal interest in 
ensuring that the European own resources were collected correctly.  
After some years, however, it was decided that the member states 
would be permitted to deduct the collection costs immediately and transfer 
just 90% to ‘Brussels’. This was not just a technical issue, despite 
appearances. The decision had the direct effect of depriving the European 
Economic Community of its means of verifying the correctness of the 
process, as having to claim money back later, where relevant, is potentially 
more complex and fosters resistance. Moreover, transferring just 90% 
ignored the fact that the EC had full title to the own resources from the 
moment that they were levied from the liable person.  
Changes in the rate of call of the VAT-based own resource  
It proved possible to operate for some ten years (from 1975) with the 
maximum of 1% of VAT, but tensions grew as the ceiling came closer. The 
Council was not disposed to raise the ceiling without debate. The question 
of ‘future financing’ surfaced again on various occasions. 
Against the background of recurrent agricultural surpluses, 
Parliament called for the VAT ceiling to be raised in conjunction with 
measures to eliminate structural agricultural surpluses. The European 
Commission proposed an immediate increase in the ceiling to 1.4% and the 
option of a subsequent further rise of 0.4%. 
Parliament did not accept a revision based on a variable percentage of 
VAT geared to the shares of Community agricultural appropriations spent 
in the member states. The Council ruled out any increase in excess of 1.4%, 
                                                      
4 From the very beginning, it was decided that the European Community would 
not established its own tax authority. EUROPE FOR GROWTH | 9  
but the Commission argued in favour of a ceiling of 2% in order not to be 
dependent on obtaining approval from all the national parliaments each 
year. For the 1984 and 1985 budgets, it was necessary to resort to 
supplementary financing obtained by means of intergovernmental 
arrangements approved by national parliaments. The European Parliament 
was confronted with the realities of the limits to financial autonomy. After 
many debates and consultations, in May 1985 the Council took a second 
decision on own resources, raising the ceiling from 1% to 1.4%5, an increase 
which however was immediately swallowed up by the supplementary 
preliminary draft budget of 1986. Spain and Portugal were to join the EEC 
on 1 January 1986. 
The British rebate 
In 1973, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland joined the EEC. In 
accordance with the transitional period which the new member states had 
negotiated for the initial years after the entry into force of the accession 
treaty, the own resource levies were discounted on a gradually decreasing 
scale. 
Following this transition period, the United Kingdom became 
agitated about what it paid to the EEC and what it received in return. It 
was importing a relatively large volume of agricultural products from third 
countries and had a relatively small agricultural sector itself. By way of 
compensation, a system of specific expenditure (regional support and 
funding of infrastructure) was established for the benefit of the UK. 
But Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher did not consider this 
arrangement to be sufficient, and made her famous statement: ‘I want my 
money back’. However, it was not ‘her money’, because what the United 
Kingdom had paid to Brussels was the EEC’s own resources. 
Mrs Thatcher’s statement therefore went to the very heart of the 
financing of the Community budget. However, the Fontainebleau 
agreement (1984) conceded the UK’s case by granting it a rebate on the 
difference between its share of the VAT revenue and its share of 
Community expenditure. This ‘correction’ was performed by reducing the 
UK’s VAT base, at the expense of all the member states, in proportion to 
each State’s share in VAT transfers, with the exception of Germany, which 
                                                      
5 Council decision of 7 May 1985 on the Communities' system of own resources, OJ 
L 128, 14 May 1985. 10 | HISTORY OF THE SYSTEM OF COMMUNITY OWN RESOURCES 
 
was allowed to contribute only two thirds of its normal share to the 
correction (the balance being shared among the other member states). 
Three VAT percentages therefore had to be determined: one for the 
UK, one for Germany and a third for the other member states.  
This decision, which was originally intended to be transitional, 
ultimately survived and remains in force to this day. It strongly promoted 
the concept of the ‘just return’ in relations between member states and the 
European Union. Since the rebate was granted, the accounting logic of the 
member states has remained in constant development. Bit by bit, the 
Community financing system has been transformed into a complex set of 
rebates and miscellaneous calculations, rendering it totally 
incomprehensible for non-initiates. 
1.3  From 1988 to the present day: Propagation and domination of 
the concept of the just return 
As explained above, in the early 1980s the maximum figure of 1% for the 
VAT base was attained, and the rise in the rate to 1.40% was immediately 
swallowed up by the accession of Spain and Portugal.  
In these years, the Commission was even compelled to submit a 
preliminary draft budget covering 10 months rather than 12, because the 
funds were then not sufficient for 12  months. This draft budget was 
nonetheless rejected on the basis of the Treaty, which required a budget to 
be adopted covering 12 months. An intergovernmental loan then had to be 
negotiated for two years in order to fill the gaps in the budget, as the Treaty 
did not permit any budget deficit. 
The constantly growing tensions between the two arms of the 
budgetary authority led to the annual budget’s being rejected on three 
occasions (1979, 1982, 1984) and to recourse to the system of provisional 
twelfths, which enabled the EC to continue to function, but prevented any 
new initiatives or policies from being adopted. 
In response to this budgetary impasse, a reform of the own resources 
system was urgent. Unfortunately, this revision put an end to the already 
badly eroded autonomy of Community revenue. EUROPE FOR GROWTH | 11  
1988: The Single European Act and the establishment of a 4th ‘own 
resource’ 
Indeed, in order to put a stop to this recurrent tussling over the budget, 
Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission, had the idea 
of creating the first Financial Perspective, covering the period 1988-1992, i.e. 
a period of five years. This Financial Perspective, which was based on the 
Single European Act and governed by an Interinstitutional Agreement, 
imposed, from 1988, annual ceilings on expenditure and the Community’s 
own resources for five years, which the Commission was empowered to 
call on annually. In future the European budget could no longer exceed a 
ceiling indexed to the GNP of all the member states. In 1992, the ceiling on 
payments to be made during that year was 1.2% of the total GNP of the 
member states: the expenditure to be budgeted for, which could not exceed 
this ceiling, was financed from four sources: the three existing sources and 
a new own resource, based on ‘the application of a percentage, determined 
during the budgetary procedure in consideration of the total of all other 
revenues, to an additional base that is the sum of the GNP’. The European 
share of VAT remained fixed at 1.4% of the Community base.6 
The intended aim of introducing the Financial Perspective system 
was to ensure the budgetary stability necessary for the establishment of the 
internal market. But the price to be paid by Parliament in exchange for this 
financial stability was a loss of its influence over the Community budget. 
Above all, the fourth own resource greatly weakened the Community’s 
financial autonomy. 
 1994: Establishment of the GNI resource 
An important meeting of the European Council was held in Edinburgh in 
1992, towards the end of the period covered by the first Financial 
Perspective, at which decisions were taken concerning the forthcoming 
period, particularly an unprecedented increase in the budget allocated to 
the Structural Funds.7 After this Council, the Commission formulated 
proposals resulting in fresh multiannual perspectives, but, in fact, the 
                                                      
6 Council decision of 24 June 1988 on the system of the European Communities' 
own resources, OJ L 185, 15.07.1988. 
7 In the 1987 budget, the amount reserved for the Structural Funds was ECU 6.5 
billion; in the 1994 budget it was ECU 23 billion; both budgets were for 12 member 
states. 12 | HISTORY OF THE SYSTEM OF COMMUNITY OWN RESOURCES 
 
power of decision rested with the European Council, deciding 
unanimously on the multiannual financial framework.  
As in 1988, the Council linked its agreement on the second Financial 
Perspective (1993-1999) to a fourth decision on the own resources system, 
adopted on 31 October 1994.8  
Under this new decision, own resources (i.e. total own resources) 
were subject to an annual ceiling of 1.2% of GNP in 1993 and 1.27% of GNP 
in 1999. The fourth own resource, based on GNP, remained in existence, 
but was now accompanied by formulae, ceilings and caps, as well as the 
ever present ‘British rebate’.  
The maximum VAT transfer was gradually reduced from 1.4% to 1%. 
The VAT percentage was no longer dependent on the size of the budget, 
but rather a fixed percentage. The percentage that varied according to the 
budget was now that of the fourth own resource, which was based on GNP.  
1999: The Berlin Summit: recognition of the concepts of the ‘net 
contributor’ and the ‘net beneficiary’ 
It was during this period that member states began to heavily advertise 
their ‘net positions’ and the fact that they were the ‘highest payers’ in the 
EU. For a long time, the Commission opposed the concepts of the ‘net 
contributor’ and the ‘net beneficiary’, but in the member states it became 
increasingly common to use the term ‘contribution’ to designate the 
European funds which the member states transferred to Brussels after 
collecting them. These amounts thus reappeared in the national budgets of 
nearly all member states as expenditure conceded to Europe. This approach 
to accounting placed European funds in competition with national 
spending. 
In 1999, at the Berlin European Council, which resulted in Agenda 
2000 and the third Financial Perspective (2000-2006), the financial 
advantages negotiated by the countries making the demands were largely 
achieved through further erosion of the concept of structural own resources 
and of transparency for citizens. For example, the percentages that the 
member states were permitted to deduct from the traditional own 
resources were increased to 25%. Originally 5% had been felt to be 
                                                      
8 Council Decision of 31 October 1994 on the system of the European Communities' 
own resources, OJ L 293, 12.11.1994. EUROPE FOR GROWTH | 13  
adequate as a reimbursement to member states of the collection costs, but 
the amount was fixed at 10% to provide some small encouragement for 
correct collection of the resources to support Europe. Twenty-five percent 
bore no relation whatsoever to the actual costs, but was simply the outcome 
of a complex calculation that benefited the Netherlands and simply had not 
been vetoed by other countries. The term ‘collection costs’ had lost all the 
meaning it initially had in the Own Resources Decision. The agreement also 
stipulated that Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden only had to 
contribute one quarter of the normal costs paid by all member states 
toward the British ‘rebate’, which was still being maintained. This was all 
laid down in legal provisions in the fifth Own Resources Decision of the 
Council of 29 September 2000,9 thus de facto establishing the concepts of 
the ‘net contributor’ and the ‘net beneficiary’. The recitals in the Decision 
included a reference to the decision of the Berlin European Council. The 
maximum payment based on the VAT base was lowered from 1% to 0.75% 
in 2002 and 2003 and to 0.50% from 2004. The VAT base of the member 
states remained capped at 50% of their GNP in order to avoid a ‘regressive 
levy’. The GNI resource was maintained. 
Once the battle had been lost in Berlin, the Commission was no 
longer able to check the idea of the ‘net contribution’. 
Over the years, the substance of what continued to be referred to as 
‘own resources’ was transformed considerably. With the rise of the World 
Trade Organisation, customs duties were greatly reduced worldwide. As 
for the reforms of the CAP and as for world market prices, they led to a 
reduction in agricultural levies, which were now referred to as ‘agricultural 
duties’. The own resource resulting from the GNP base became by far the 
largest source of income for the EU budget.  
2007: The sixth decision on own resources, apotheosis of the just return 
On 15 December 2003, as negotiations began on the next multiannual 
financial framework (2007-2013), the Heads of State or Government of the 
UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden – all net 
contributors – wrote a letter to the President of the Commission, José 
Manuel Barroso, calling for Community expenditure to be limited to 1% of 
GNI in the next Financial Perspective. 
                                                      
9 Council Decision of 29 September 2000 on the system of the European 
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This set the tone for the forthcoming negotiations, and it was in this 
context that the conclusions of the Brussels European Council of December 
2005 again strengthened the position of the net contributors. The rate of call 
of the VAT-based own resource was frozen at 0.30%, reference was made to 
the European Council decisions of December 2005 providing for a reduced 
rate of call for the Netherlands, Austria, Germany and Sweden, and it was 
also decided that the Netherlands should be granted a gross rebate of €605 
million on its GNI-based annual contribution. Sweden obtained a gross 
rebate of €150 million on its GNI-based annual contribution over the same 
period. Lastly, the British rebate and the corresponding correction for the 
Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and Austria were maintained and the 
participation of the UK in the financing of the cost of enlargement was 
deferred until ‘2013 at the latest’.10 
The sixth decision on the own resources system was taken on 7 June 
2007,11 barely two years after the long negotiations at the Brussels summit. 
Its text, which reflects the conclusions on the subject of revenue adopted by 
the European Council in December 2005, is virtually unreadable, due to its 
complexity and the numerous exceptions. The outcome of a complex 
mathematical calculation is that the UK keeps its correction arrangement, 
as do Germany, Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands, whose rebate on 
their participation in the financing of Britain’s rebate is maintained.  
                                                      
10 European Council Decision of 16 and 17 December 2005 on the Financial 
Perspective for 2007-2013 – document no 15915/05. 
11 Council decision of 7 June 2007 on the system of the European Communities' 




2.  PITFALLS IN THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF 
FINANCING THE EU 
2.1  Why bother about the EU financing system? 
An idea that pervades much of the discussion of EU budget reform is that 
the problems essentially fall on the expenditure side. The EU budget, it is 
argued, is a “relic of the past”. It is heavily titled towards agriculture and 
cohesion and does not provide adequate finance to address today’s most 
acute EU challenges – global competitiveness, security or climate change. 
Budget reform is urgently needed, it is claimed, to “focus EU spending on 
the right areas”.  
No one can neglect the importance of revising the EU spending 
priorities. Yet a narrow focus on expenditures alone is a recipe for failure. 
History reminds us that previous attempts to undertake an ambitious 
reform of EU finances have only succeeded when tackling simultaneously 
all the elements of the budgetary system: expenditures, revenues and 
procedures.12 We can endlessly debate EU spending priorities, but this will 
serve to no avail if we do not address simultaneously the structural factors 
explaining the path-dependency characteristics of EU budgetary 
negotiations.  
One of these factors is the structure of the revenues. The EU is 
currently financed by three revenue sources: i) custom and agricultural 
levies (the so-called TOR, or ‘traditional own resources’); ii) a levy on 
national Value Added Tax (VAT) receipts and iii) member states’ 
contributions paid according to levels of gross national income (GNI). 
While initially conceived to play a residual role, over the last decade this 
GNI resource has come to represent the dominant share of total EU 
revenues (see Figure 1). 
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The overwhelming dependency of the EU budget on national 
contributions has an influence on the way EU spending decisions are taken. 
The overt character of national contributions, which have a clear link to 
national treasuries, accentuates member states’ tendency to calculate their 
net budgetary return (that is, the difference between what they pay and 
what they receive from the EU). The result is a decision-making process 
conducive to status quo, with ‘net contributors’ blocking any increase in the 
overall budget ceiling for fear of having their contributions increased and 
‘net recipients’ defending existing expenditure programs.  
The dominance of the ‘net return’ logic has not only prevented a 
rational allocation of EU resources, but it has also made the system very 
complex. In effect, the necessary payments to secure the approval of the 
financial package have resulted in a proliferation of rebates, preferential 
clauses and ad hoc exemptions aimed at ‘correcting’ national budgetary 
positions. The result is an EU financing system that is extremely complex, 
opaque and completely incomprehensible to European citizens. 
2.2  An illustration of how the ‘net return’ logic blocks a major EU 
budget reform:  
The latest 2007-2013 financial perspective negotiation 
A clear illustration of the pernicious effects of the ‘net return’ logic can be 
found in the negotiations leading to the approval of the latest financial 
perspectives package (2007-2013).  
The Commission’s proposal, presented in February 2004, contained a 
pronounced shift in the allocation of resources towards “growth and 
employment with a focus on knowledge-based activities such as research 
and innovation”.13 In particular, three fields of intervention foresaw 
important increases in spending: heading 1a, “competitiveness for growth 
and employment”, heading 3, “citizenship, freedom, security and justice” 
and heading 4, “the EU as a global partner”.   
It should be noted that, in drafting its proposal, the Commission 
found itself constrained by two factors. On the one hand, there was the 
agreement taken by the Council in December 2002 to freeze CAP spending 
                                                      
13 Cf. European Commission: New proposals for growth and jobs under the next 
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up to 2013.14 The latter supposed in practice that the major budget heading 
had to be exempted from any downward adjustment. On the other hand, 
two months before the presentation of the Commission’s proposal, six 
member states (all ‘net contributors’)15 had warned the Commission that 
they would not accept a budget above 1% of EU GNI with a letter sent to 
the president of the Commission (the so-called ‘letter of the six’). 
With CAP spending politically locked and cohesion spending 
deemed important after the Eastern enlargement, devoting additional 
resources to key new areas appeared only possible by increasing the overall 
amount of EU spending. Aware of this fact, and taking note of the ‘letter of 
the six’, the Commission proposed a slight increase of EU spending. It 
foresaw an overall EU budget of €1.025 billion, representing 1.16% of EU 
GNI in payment appropriations (1.26% in commitment appropriations). 
The negotiations in the Council were particularly acrimonious. Right 
from the start, the six net contributors made it clear that their figure of 1% 
of GNI did not refer to appropriations for spending but to commitments. In 
response to this, the Luxembourg presidency proposed reducing the 
budget to 1.05 % of EU GNI, by cutting €50 billion from the Lisbon agenda 
programme (heading 1a) and €40 billion from regional aid (heading 1b). In 
addition, the UK rebate would be frozen, thereby reducing the 
contributions of the rest of net contributors.  
By welcoming the cuts on the budget, the UK stressed that the rebate 
was out of negotiation. Facing a strong pressure to eliminate the rebate, UK 
Prime Minister Blair adopted the strategy of conditioning any cut in the 
rebate to cuts on CAP. This, however, was considered unacceptable for 
France as well as for other countries that opposed the idea of re-visiting the 
agreement on CAP spending set in 2002. 
Faced with this impasse, in the weeks before the June 2005 EU 
Council the Luxembourg presidency proposed a new compromise. The 
compromise allowed the UK rebate to remain unchanged insofar as the 15 
                                                      
14 This decision had its roots in a Franco-German agreement reached during the 
final stage of the negotiations preceding the Eastern enlargement. With this deal, 
Germany secured an agreement to cap CAP spending until 2013 (preventing the 
explosion of CAP expenditure which would otherwise surely have happened after 
the entrance of the new member states into the system), whereas France ensured 
the financial support to French farmers until 2013.  
15 Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and Sweden. EUROPE FOR GROWTH | 19 
older member states were concerned, but obliged the UK to co-finance, as 
any other member state, the part of cohesion spending directed to the new 
member states. The UK categorically rejected this proposal, and the EU 
summit finished in a stalemate (see Hearl, 2006).  
In July 2005, the UK assumed the EU’s 6-month rotating Presidency. 
Prior to the formal start of the Presidency, Tony Blair gave a widely praised 
speech at the European Parliament calling for “a future-oriented EU 
budget”.16 In spite of that, the UK position did not change during its 
Presidency. Instead of leading a wide-ranging debate on EU priorities, it 
spent most of its energies defending the British rebate. 
I n  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 5 ,  s o m e  d a y s  b e f o r e  t h e  E U  C o u n c i l ,  t h e  U K  
presented a new proposal for the 2007-2013 financial package. This entailed 
a reduction of the overall budget to 1.03% of EU GNI, basically by cutting 
the regional aid planned for Central and Eastern Europe. While conceding 
the possibility of cutting its rebate, the UK continued to insist on linking it 
to reductions in CAP spending. During the negotiations, the idea of 
touching CAP spending was again opposed by a majority of countries, and 
the UK finally had to give up, taking comfort in the engagement taken to 
organize a mid-term comprehensive re-assessment of the financial 
perspectives, “including both the UK review and CAP spending”.17  
After a long night of negotiations, an agreement on the financial 
perspectives was finally reached. The deal set overall EU expenditures at 
1.045% of EU GNI. It included a temporal cut of the British rebate during 
the 2007-2013 period (to “ensure the UK’s fair contribution to the costs of 
enlargement”) and a €16 billion reduction in aid to Eastern Europe 
(Whitman, 2006). The Polish government opposed this deal until the very 
last minute, and the final agreement was only reached when the German 
chancellor Angela Merkel proposed that funds earmarked for regional 
assistance in East Germany be given to Poland. Ironically, the Polish Prime 
Minister said afterwards that it was “a beautiful gesture, hard to measure 
in zloty or euro because it is a gesture of solidarity”.18 
                                                      
16 Speech of the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair to the European Parliament, 23 June 
2005. 
17 This was indeed the origin of the 2008-2009 EU budgetary review. 
18 Reported on the eurobserver.com website on 17 December 2005 (Whitman 2006, 
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IIA - COM 
proposal 
( € million) 
Difference 
IIA - COM 
proposal 
(%) 
1. Sustainable growth  458,015  459,035  379,739  382,139  -75,876  -16.6 
(1a) Competitiveness for growth 
and employment 
121,685 120,563  72,120 74,098  -47,587  -  39.1 
(1b) Cohesion for growth 
and employment 
336,330 338,472  307,619 308.1  -28,289  -8.4 
2. Preservation and management of 
natural resources 
400,275 396,248  371,245 371.3  -28,931  -7.2 
of which: Agriculture-market 
support measures and direct aid 
payments 
301,074 293,105  293,105  293,105  -7,969  -2.6 
3. Citizenship, freedom, security and 
justice 
20,945 19,437  10,270 10.7  -10,175  -48.6 
4. The EU as a global partner  87,890  70,697  50,010  49.4  -38,427  -43.7 
5. Administration  57,670  28,620  50,300  49.8  -7,870  -13.6 
6. Compensation (Bulgaria, Romania)  240  800  800  800  560  +233.3 
Total Commitment Appropriations  1,025,035  974,837  862,364  864,316  160,719  -15.7 
in % of GNI  1.26  1.18  1.05  1.05     
Source: Schild (2008). EUROPE FOR GROWTH | 21 
 
As shown in Table 1, the final agreement reached by the Council in 
December 2005, barely modified by the Parliament in May 2006, differed 
notably from the Commission’s initial proposal. First, the size of the budget 
was well below what the Commission had requested, amounting only to 
1.05% of the EU’s GNP. Moreover, the redeployment of resources to new 
objectives, while real, was less than what the Commission had requested. 
Consequently, the profile of community spending did not change 
considerably compared with the 2000-2006 period (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Community spending profile: Comparison between 2000-2006 and 2007-
2013 (in commitment appropriations) 
Financial Framework headings 





1a. Competitiveness for growth and employment  6.1% 8.6% 
1b. Cohesion for growth and employment  38.4% 35.6% 
2. Preservation and management of natural resources  44.5% 43% 
3. Citizenship, freedom, security and justice  0.8% 1.2% 
4. The EU as a global partner  4.5% 5.7% 
5. Administration  5.1% 5.7% 
6. Reserves  0.005%  --- 
7. Compensation  0.5% 0.1% 
*As the title of headings changed from one period to the other, the comparison is based on 
the authors’ own calculations and provides only rough estimates. 
Source: Bertoncini (2007). 
2.3  The extreme complexity of the system: Does anyone 
understand anything? 
As said above, the agreement on the 2007-13 financial perspectives was 
reached after a long night of negotiation. As the vote on the financial 
framework is submitted to unanimity rule, and given member states’ 
obsession in improving their own ‘net balances’, the final deal was only 
possible to reach by including various compensation ‘gifts’ and ‘ad hoc’ 
exemptions aimed at ‘correcting’ the budgetary position of individual 
states. 
While the introduction of special clauses has happened before, in the 
latest financial framework the number of such clauses was exorbitant. A 22 | PITFALLS IN THE CURRENT EU FINANCING SYSTEM 
 
resolution of the European Parliament19 identifies 41 exemptions 
introduced by the European Council in December 2005, both on the 
revenue and the expenditure side of the budget. All these measures add up 
to the corrections and rebates that were already in place (such as the UK 
rebate), resulting into a system that is opaque and extremely complex, and 
in which the way costs and benefits are shared does not correspond to any 
logical rule. 
As the situation now stands, there are the following special treatment 
measures in the EU budget.  
On the revenue side, the UK rebate remains in place. Agreed in 1984, 
it allows the UK to be reimbursed 66% of the difference between what it 
pays to the EU budget (national contribution) and what it receives in the 
form of spending. In the latest financial perspective, the UK correction has 
been amended by excluding from the calculus the regional spending to the 
new member states.  
Apart from the UK rebate, there are the so-called ‘rebates of the 
rebate’, various correction measures included over the time to reduce the 
negative balances of the other ‘net contributors’. In 1999, it was agreed that 
Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden would pay only 25% of 
their normal financing share of the UK correction. Also in 1999, in order to 
correct the budgetary balance of the Netherlands, it was decided that the 
‘fee’ paid to member states for collecting customs duties would be 
increased from 10% to 25%. 
New corrections have been included in the 2007-2013 budget 
agreement. Whereas member states normally pay 0.3% of their VAT 
assessment base, this percentage has been reduced for the four ‘net 
contributors’ for the period 2007-2013 only. To make things more complex, 
a different percentage has been set for each of these countries (0.15 for 
Germany, 0.10 for the Netherlands, 0.225 for Austria and 0.10 for Sweden). 
In addition, a further correction has been introduced for the Netherlands 
and Sweden: both countries have been granted an annual reduction of their 
GNI contribution during the 2007-13 period (a reduction of €605 million 
and €150 million, respectively). 
                                                      
19 European Parliament Resolution of 29 March 2007 on the future of the European 
Union’s own resources.  EUROPE FOR GROWTH | 23 
On the expenditure side, the 2007-2013 financial framework contains 
many ad hoc payments under the Structural Funds that violate the general 
allocation rule, and which are included without any explanation. There are, 
for instance, unexplained special payments to Bavaria (€75 million), to the 
Hungarian Region of Közép-Magyarorszäg (€140 million) and to the city of 
Prague (€200 million). There are also special treatment clauses for 
particular States, which constitute blatant violations to the general rules 
concerning the functioning of the structural funds (i.e. Poland is granted a 
higher absorption rate to use structural funding and Cyprus, despite never 
being an objective 1 region, is entitled to ‘phase 2’ support). 
Box 1. Exceptions introduced by the European Council in December 2005 on the 
expenditure and income side of the budget 
Earmarked for Projects 
•  €865 million for the nuclear power plant Ignalina (Lithuania) and €375 
million for the nuclear power plant Bohunice (Slovakia) 
•  €200 million for the peace process in Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) 
Earmarked for Regions 
•  €879 million for five Polish Objective 2 regions (€107 per citizen) 
•  €140 million for a Hungarian region (Közép-Magyarország) 
•  €200 million for Prague 
•  "phasing-out" support for a Finnish Region and Madeira, which were 
originally "phasing-in" regions 
•  €100 million for the Canary Islands 
•  €150 million for Austrian border regions 
•  €75 million for Bavaria 
•  €50 million for Ceuta and Melilla (Spain) 
•  €225 million for eastern German Länder 
•  €136 million for the most remote regions (€35 per citizen) 
•  €150 million for the Swedish regions in Objective "Competitiveness and 
Employment" 
Special Funds for Member States 
•  absorption rate for Poland raised by 4%  
•  "phasing-in" support for Cyprus, despite never being Objective 1 region 
•  €2,000 million for Spain, to be distributed freely among Structural Fund 
Objectives 
•  €1,400 million for Italy (predefined distribution) 
•  €100 million for France (Objective: "Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment") 
•  €47 million for Estonia (€35 per citizen) 24 | PITFALLS IN THE CURRENT EU FINANCING SYSTEM 
 
•  €81 million for Lithuania (€35 per citizen) 
•  additional payments from rural development:  
€1,350 million for Austria 
€460 million for Finland 
€500 million for Ireland 
€500 million for Italy 
€20 million for Luxembourg 
€100 million for France 
€820 million for Sweden 
€320 million for Portugal 
Special Conditions 
•  50% increased support for the former exterior borders to Romania and 
Bulgaria, compared to regular support for border regions 
•  private co-financing can be counted in for Structural Fund supported 
projects in new Member States (per capita GDP <85% of EU average) and 
eastern German Länder  
•  in the new Member States (<85%), VAT can be considered eligible cost for 
Structural Fund projects 
Special Conditions in Legal Bases 
•  departing from "n+2" rule for new Member States (<85%) in 2007-2010 
•  building projects are eligible for support in the new Member States (EU10 
+ Romania, Bulgaria)  
•  20% of funds from the first pillar (Agriculture) can be used by each 
country for rural development, disregarding general rules such as co-
financing  
•  special funds for rural development in Portugal (€320 million), without co-
financing 
Special Conditions for Financing the Budget 
•  rate-of-call for VAT own resources contribution is reduced by 25% for 
Austria 
•  rate-of-call for VAT own resources contribution is reduced by 50% for 
Germany 
•  rate-of-call for VAT own resources contribution is reduced by 66% for 
Sweden and the Netherlands  
•  the Netherlands get €4,230 million (GNI 'own-resources')  
•  Sweden gets €1,050 million (GNI 'own resources')  
•  the rebate for the UK is kept, reduced by certain phased-in payments for 
the new Member States. 
Source: Extract from the annex to the Report of the European Parliament on the future of 
own resources adopted on 29 March 2007, P6_TA(2007)0098. EUROPE FOR GROWTH | 25 
2.4  If at least it was rooted on sound economic basis... (or why ‘net 
returns’ calculations are devoid of economic meaning) 
As seen above, member states’ obsession to take their own ‘net balance’ as 
the decisive criterion to assess any potential outcome in EU budgetary 
negotiations leads to sub-optimal results. These could be more or less 
tolerated or accepted if ‘net balance’ demands were founded on legitimate 
grounds. But the fact is that the justification of any notion of ‘net balances’ 
is weak (Le Cacheux, 2005). 
To start with, the way budget balances are calculated is fairly 
arbitrary, as they are based on questionable assumptions concerning the 
geographical allocation of expenditures and receipts. Thus, for instance, it 
is common practice for member states with ports serving as an entry point 
to the single market (Rotterdam in the Netherlands is the clearest example) 
to include the receipts from customs duties and agriculture levies which are 
imposed in their countries as part of their national contributions to the EU 
budget. This is clearly wrong, as most of the time the final purchaser of 
these goods (and thus the one that ultimately bears the cost of the import 
tax) is a citizen from another EU country.20 As concerns expenditures, there 
are many programmes for which it is equally difficult to geographically 
allocate the beneficiaries. The clearest example is the award of mobility 
grants to students (under the Erasmus programme). Who benefits from 
Erasmus? The students themselves, the university in which the students are 
enrolled or the university that receives them? Probably all of them in 
different degrees. Or take for instance the case of the External Borders 
Fund, in heading 3 of the budget (“citizenship, freedom, security and 
justice”), which co-finances investment in infrastructures, equipment and 
training to secure the external borders of the EU and Schengen. Who 
benefits from this expenditure: the countries having external borders or all 
member states? 
Apart from the arbitrary nature of the geographical allocation rules, a 
more fundamental criticism to the ‘net balances’ approach is that it totally 
neglects the second-level benefits of EU expenditures. In effect, the ‘net 
returns’ calculus takes only into consideration the initial direct beneficiaries 
                                                      
20 A study published by the European Commission in 1998 estimated that nearly 
5 0 %  o f  g o o d s  o n  w h i c h  e x c i s e  d u t y  i s  l e v i e d  a t  t h e  p o r t s  o f  A n t w e r p  a n d  
Rotterdam are destined for other European Union countries (Verbecke et al., 1998, 
cited by Le Cacheux, 2005, p. 13). 
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of the EU expenditure, that is, those receiving the money. However, many 
EU expenditures have other beneficiaries rather than direct recipients. Take 
for instance the EU structural and cohesion spending. An important part of 
this spending is earmarked for infrastructure investment projects. As these 
contracts are awarded on a competitive basis through an EU open tender, 
an important percentage of these contracts are won by large companies 
based on the so-called ‘net contributors’ countries. At a more aggregate 
level, the demand triggered by the EU structural and cohesion spending in 
poorer countries benefits the companies of richer countries, who face larger 
demand for their exports. This is particularly true if we take into account 
that many of the countries currently receiving structural and cohesion 
spending are among the most integrated economies in terms of imports.21  
For other EU expenditure possessing the properties of ‘public good’, 
the existence of ultimate beneficiaries other than the recipients is even more 
evident. For instance, a pure accounting net balance approach fails to 
recognise the public benefits of the LIFE+ programme, which supports 
projects aimed at preserving the biodiversity and provides grants for 
demonstration projects on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
Ultimately, as pointed out by Le Cacheux (2005), the fundamental 
flaw of the concept of ‘net returns’ is the underlying assumption on which 
it is based concerning the gains of the process of integration. In effect, the 
narrow-minded accounting approach is rooted in a vision of the process of 
European integration as a ‘zero-sum’ game, in which what some countries 
win is always at the expense of the others. It fails to understand that most 
EU policies, and the process of integration itself, generate mutual benefits. 
As noted by Le Cacheux, “if by chance some countries or regions are losers 
on one particular issue, the overall net gain is, so to speak, sufficient to 
offset their losses. These processes are therefore positive sum games, with 
the sum of the winners’ gain always representing more than the losses 
suffered by the losers” (2005: 18). 
                                                      
21 According to a recent Commission document, intra-EU imports in many new 
member states account for 40-50% of GDP, whereas the average ERU 27 ratio is 
around 17% (Commission Staff Working Document  – technical annex 
accompanying the Communication from the Commission on “The EU Budget 
Review”, SEC (2010) 7000 final). EUROPE FOR GROWTH | 27 
2.5  Why the shift towards a real EU own resource-based system is 
the only way to resolve the ‘net returns’ problem 
Some people consider that the arguments provided above are not sufficient 
to justify a major reform of the EU financing system. They argue that the 
current funding system, based on GNI-based national contributions, works 
reasonably well and that a shift towards a real own resource-based system 
is not warranted. There are in fact two types of objections to the need to 
move towards an own resource-based system. 
Some question that the shift towards a system based on owned fiscal 
means, i.e. EU taxes, will eliminate the net balance disputes. According to 
them, as national administrations will be those responsible for collecting 
the receipts from any potential EU own resource, they will still be tempted 
to calculate ‘their’ contribution to the EU budget. Indeed, they argue, the 
fact is that national governments already include the receipts from EU 
customs and agricultural levies collected in their territory into their 
calculus of budgetary returns.  
This objection does not seem quite convincing. While it is true that 
national administrations will be those collecting the receipts from a new EU 
own resource, there is a fundamental difference between the existing 
national GNI-based contribution and the receipts of any potential real EU 
own revenue. In the latter, revenues would be collected by the member 
states but once collected they will directly go to the EU coffers instead of 
passing through the national budgets. Thus, national governments will be 
less tempted to perceive these revenues as ‘their own money’. No doubt, 
they will still be sensitive to the geographical allocation of receipts, but the 
debate would likely be more in terms of the distribution of effective tax 
burdens on categories of taxpayers than in terms of distribution across 
national budgets.  
Others accept that the problem of ‘net returns’ is related to the 
dominance of national contributions in the EU financing system, but 
consider that any attempt of eliminating ‘net resources’ is politically 
unrealistic and naïve. Instead of trying to get rid of it, they argue, we 
should spend our energy in trying to minimise the undesirable side effects 
of the ‘net return’ logic. The multiple proposals to create a ‘generalised 
correction mechanism’ respond to this way of seeing things. These 
proposals received some attention some years ago (particularly in 2004, 
when the Commission itself proposed a generalised correction mechanism), 
but they did not attract much interest as they did not suppose a real 28 | PITFALLS IN THE CURRENT EU FINANCING SYSTEM 
 
advantage in terms of simplification nor did they eliminate the distortive 
effects of the ‘net returns’ logic on EU spending decisions.  
Recently, a proposal that has received some attention is the idea of 
creating a system in which member states negotiate their net balances in 
advance, and once these are fixed, they discuss the structure of EU 
spending. Afterwards, a system of horizontal transfers compensates 
member states from any deviations from the pre-fixed budgetary position 
(De la Fuente et al., 2008, Salvemini et al., 2009). 
Those proposing this solution argue that, by isolating the discussion 
on ‘net returns’ from the rest of the negotiation, member states will have no 
incentive “to distort expenditure policies in order to achieve an acceptable 
distribution of net financial contributions” (De la Fuente et al., 2009). 
However, the idea that, by fixing net returns ex ante, member states will 
discuss EU spending programmes on their own merits and not in terms of 
their budgetary interest is highly questionable. In fact, a system like this 
might create other types of distortions. Imagine a ‘net beneficiary’ country 
that succeeds in guaranteeing a certain budgetary return. Once the net 
return is pre-fixed, the country has two options: either fighting in the 
subsequent negotiation to obtain more EU spending on its territory 
(submitted to strict rules of co-financing, additionality, etc.) or simply 
letting its net budgetary position worsen. In this latter case, the country will 
receive the guaranteed compensation in form of cash (thus not subject to 
any rule). As the second option is clearly preferable (it would receive the 
same amount of money but free of conditions), the incentive for this 
country will be not to fight for more, but for less EU spending in its 
territory. The result is a decision-making process conducive to an under-
supply of EU programmes having an EU added value. 
2.6  Conclusions 
While the first ‘net balances’ calculations date back to the 1980s, it is over 
the last two decades that the ‘net balances’ criteria has come to dominate all 
other considerations in EU budgetary negotiations, with very negative 
consequences in terms of efficiency, equity and transparency. This has 
happened at a time when national contributions have come to represent far 
more than half of total EU revenue. The coincidence in time, together with 
the special nature of the GNI-based revenue (which, although formally 
labelled as ‘own resource’, is frequently perceived as a member states’ 
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of the variables explaining the absolute dominance of the ‘net balance’ 
approach in EU budgetary negotiations.  
Member states’ concerns over the distributional outcome of 
budgetary negotiations are to a certain extent legitimate, and will probably 
remain regardless of the type of EU financing system in place. However, 
there are grounds to believe that a shift towards a real own resources-based 
financing system might help to move the debates away from a limited and 
dubious conception of ‘horizontal fairness’ (based on a purely accounting 
logic of ‘net national contributions’) towards well-founded discussions on 
horizontal and vertical fairness and efficiency considerations. A new EU 
financing system based on own resources would also provide important 
advantages in terms of simplicity, transparency and political 




3.  FINANCING THE EUROPEAN UNION:  
REFORM FOR OWN RESOURCES 
3.1  Possible new own resources: The European Commission’s 
proposals 
As shown in previous chapters, successive decisions on own resources 
have gradually moved the system of financing the EU budget further and 
further away from the original goal of the Treaty of Rome, which provided 
for the European budget to be entirely financed by own resources. The 
culmination of this process was the most recent decision in 2007, which 
implemented the Conclusions of the European Council meeting in 
December 2005. The repercussions of these developments are increasingly 
weighing on the decision-making process of the European Union, and are 
making root-and-branch reform of the system of financing the EU not only 
essential but also urgent.  
It is not just a question of guaranteeing independent financing for the 
European Union, i.e. based entirely on proper own resources, but also of 
simplifying the system and making it more transparent and visible to 
European citizens.  
In its Communication of 19 October 2010 on the EU Budget Review, 
the European Commission sets out the shortcomings of the EU’s current 
system of financing and proposes an option for reform, which would 
involve simplifying the current system and progressively introducing, in 
parallel, one or more own resources linked to EU policies. 
This budget review exercise undertaken by the Commission is 
provided for in Declaration No. 3 annexed to the Interinstitutional 
Agreement on budgetary discipline and sound financial management of 17 
May 2006, according to which the Commission is invited to “undertake a 
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the Common Agricultural Policy, and of resources, including the United 
Kingdom rebate, and to report in 2008/2009”. 
The ‘simplification’ phase proposed by the Commission involves 
ending the VAT-based resource in its current form (the complexity and 
impenetrability of which was highlighted previously). 
The European Commission proposes to offset ending the VAT-based 
resource in its current form by progressively introducing one or more new 
own resources. It details six options, namely:  
•  EU taxation of the financial sector, 
•  EU revenues from auctioning under the greenhouse gas emissions 
trading system, 
•  EU charge related to air transport, 
•  EU VAT, 
•  EU energy tax and 
•  EU corporate income tax. 
The criteria used by the Commission to draw up this selection were 
as follows:  
•  close link to the acquis and the objectives of the EU, 
•  cross-border in nature and based on a system covering the whole 
internal market, 
•  calculation on a harmonised base, 
•  if feasible, collected directly by the EU outside national budgets, 
•  equitable application, 
•  account taken of their cumulative impact on particular sectors and 
•  no new or heavy administrative responsibility for the EU in terms of 
collection. 
The Commission actually proposed a reform of the system of 
financing the EU budget in 2004, based on the introduction of a new own 
resources. At that time, the Commission limited its proposal to three 
options: EU VAT, EU energy tax and EU corporate income tax.  
The Commission’s current proposal should also be viewed in the 
context of the European Parliament’s report on the future of the European 
Union’s own resources, adopted on 29 March 2007.22 This report, drawn up 
following in-depth consultations with the national parliaments, puts 
                                                      
22 R e p o r t  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  P a r l i a m e n t  (Rapporteur: Alain Lamassoure) on the 
future of the European Union’s own resources, adopted on 29 March 2007, 
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forward four options for a possible own resource, namely: energy tax, EU 
VAT, corporate income tax and an excise duty on tobacco or alcohol. 
The Commission’s latest proposals for new own resources therefore 
follow on from its 2004 proposals and from the European Parliament’s 
proposals. 
However, the criteria used to select the Commission’s proposals in 
2004 and the European Parliament’s proposals in 2007 differ somewhat 
from those indicated by the Commission in its recent budget review. 
In 2004 the Commission put forward the following seven assessment 
criteria: 
•  visibility and simplicity, 
•  financial autonomy, 
•  efficient allocation of resources, 
•  sufficiency, 
•  cost-effectiveness in relation to administrative costs, 
•  stability and 
•  fair contributions. 
The criteria used by Parliament in its March 2007 report nearly match the 
criteria used by the European Commission in 2004: 
•  sufficiency, 
•  stability, 
•  visibility and simplicity, 
•  low operating costs, 
•  efficient allocation of resources, 
•  vertical equity,  
•  horizontal equity and 
•  fair contributions.  
It therefore seems appropriate to assess the six candidate new own 
resources listed by the European Commission in its EU budget review with 
regard to these eight EP criteria, which means answering the following 
questions: 
•  Sufficiency. Could this new resource provide sufficient revenues in 
the long term to finance the EU budget?  
•  Stability. Could this new resource bring about sufficiently stable 
revenues to finance the EU budget? EUROPE FOR GROWTH | 33 
•  Visibility and simplicity. Would this new resource be sufficiently 
visible to European citizens and easy for them to understand? 
•  Low operating costs. Would the introduction and collection of such a 
resource involve excessive operating costs? 
•  Efficient allocation of resources. Is there a risk of this new tax altering 
the behaviour of economic operators and unbalancing the 
geographical distribution of investments in Europe? Might this new 
tax result in the introduction of European policies encouraging a 
change in the behaviour of individuals? 
•  Vertical equity. Would this tax involve income redistribution? 
•  Horizontal equity. Would this tax have the same impact on taxpayers 
who are in the same situation but live in different member countries? 
•  Fair contributions. Would this new tax raise revenues from member 
states in line with their economic development? 
Financial sector taxation 
The Commission distinguishes between two types of taxation for the 
financial sector: the financial transaction tax which is designed to tax the 
value of single transactions, and the financial activities tax, proposed by the 
International Monetary Fund, whose aim is to tax total profit and wages or 
can specifically target economic rents and/or risk.  
Volumes of financial transactions have increased dramatically in the 
past years. Taxation on the financial sector could in theory provide a 
significant source of revenue given the large number of financial 
transactions, but the activity in the financial sector is inherently unstable 
and depends on a number of economic, technological, legislative and 
political factors. The Commission believes that a financial transaction tax 
(FTT) levied on exchange traded equity and bonds with a rate of 0.1% 
could generate some €20 billion per year for the EU-27.23  
Nevertheless, the possible implications of such taxation should be 
analysed with great accuracy. In fact, if the rate of this tax were too high or 
if the European Union decided to introduce taxation on financial 
transactions, separately from the rest of the world, this might incite 
financial markets to relocate to geographic areas not subject to a financial 
transaction tax.  
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Visible to investors and operators in the financial market, this tax 
would only affect a small part of the population. However, as a 
consequence of the economic and financial crisis, support among the 
European population in favour of a tax on the financial sector has 
increased. The implementation of this type of tax should be relatively 
simple, as it could operate as a withholding tax on financial transactions.  
As stated above, the high sensitivity of financial markets to taxation 
requires great care in choosing rates. The rate should be as low as possible 
to avoid any imbalance between the EU financial centres as well as those 
outside the EU (such as Switzerland). The very definition of the level below 
which these charges would be considered low enough not to affect the 
operation of financial markets is a particularly difficult and sensitive 
exercise. However, a transaction financial tax could be a complementary 
element in the field of European financial regulation and the integration 
that has been reached in European financial markets could also facilitate a 
common tax approach. 
As regards the criteria of vertical equity, the impact in terms of 
redistribution of revenue becomes particularly clear at this point, as 
taxation on financial transactions mainly affects high-income households. 
Additionally, a fairer distribution of the tax burden could be guaranteed 
since so far labour, environment and goods are taxed while financial 
transactions are not taxed everywhere. If the same rate is applied across the 
European Union, and if the tax is applied to the same financial products, 
one could presume that a financial transaction tax would fulfil the criterion 
of horizontal equity. 
Lastly, administrative costs relating to the collection of this tax should 
not be high, as this tax would just be part of the trading platforms, which 
are all automated.  
EU revenues from auctioning under the greenhouse gas emissions 
trading system (EU ETS)  
Under the European Union greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading 
scheme (ETS), valid from 2013 to 2020, the ceiling for CO2 emissions in the 
EU will gradually decrease, while the rights of auctioned permits will 
increase. According to the Commission proposal, the product of these 
auctions could possibly constitute a new own resource for the Community 
budget. At present, these revenues are allocated to national budgets. The 
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existing revenues to the EU budget. However, it is worth remembering that 
an agreement in Council on the EU ETS has been possible only on the 
condition that the revenue of the auctioning of GHG emissions were 
allocated to national budgets.  
The European Commission expects that, by 2020, auctioning under 
the EU ETS could well generate €20 billion a year. However, this estimate 
only includes power generation and energy-intensive manufacturing 
industries. What is more, everything suggests that future revenues could 
increase, as the gradual reduction of quotas (EU allowances) should lead to 
higher bids, and that by 2013 the aviation sector will also be included in the 
EU ETS, while other sectors may follow suit, e.g. shipping. It should 
however not necessarily be expected that the coverage in a 2020 perspective 
may dramatically increase, as many other areas with substantial emissions 
(e.g. agriculture, waste, transport other than aviation) typically are not 
characterised by large point source emissions, which are easy to measure. 
In response to those who foresee a decrease in this income bearing in mind 
that the very purpose of the ETS is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the 
Commission has stated that this decline should be offset by the progressive 
increase in the price of allowances, which will result from the gradual 
reduction of quotas.  
It seems that income from such taxation would not only be significant 
but should also be sufficiently stable. Nevertheless, analysis highlights the 
risk of volatility in the price of a tonne of CO2. For instance, Le Cacheux 
and Laurent (2009) recall the fall in prices, from €29.75 on 18 April 2006 to 
€10.14 on 12 May 2006, following the over-allocation of licences by national 
governments. After some measures taken by the Commission, the prices 
recovered, but then the economic crisis struck, which led to lower CO2 
emissions. This resulted in a further decline in the CO2 per tonne price, 
from €28 in July 2008 to €7.9 in February 2009. Since then, the price has 
increased again, and seems to be more stable at €15 per tonne of CO2, but 
given past experience, one must remain cautious about the stability of this 
revenue.  
If one considers the sensitivity expressed by European citizens in 
relation to environmental issues and their support of policies relating to the 
fight against climate change, we could say that this resource meets the 
visibility criteria. It is relatively simple, as it represents the proceeds from 
the auctioning of allowances for greenhouse gas emissions, whose ceiling 
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Moreover, the correlation between this resource and the political 
objectives of the European Union is obvious. But is the ecological efficiency 
of the European market for greenhouse gases emissions sufficient to 
achieve the European Union objectives in this area? As demonstrated by Le 
Cacheux and Laurent (2009), this tax is in line with the ideal of what should 
be a Pigouvian tax, although, for other experts, it is too early to predict 
whether it would help the EU in reaching the target of a cut of greenhouse 
gas emissions by 20% by 2020.  
As regards vertical equity, European citizens should not be directly 
affected by this tax. But given the fact that electricity generators pass the 
cost of allowances on to consumers, although electricity consumption costs 
are generally more strongly felt by people on low incomes, the cost of this 
auction spread over all consumers should have little impact on household 
invoices, as the final electricity price is mainly a result of taxes and grid 
costs. The impact on households with the same consumption of electricity 
might differ according to the energy mix used to produce electricity (which 
differs widely across member countries). One could also argue that the ETS 
approach would not achieve horizontal equity. However, if one accepts 
that the tax base is really CO2 emissions, then this tax would fulfil the 
criterion of horizontal equity (this is also the key underlying issue 
regarding the equity of the carbon tax discussed below). 
Laying down a different emissions ceiling for each member state 
rather than a common one in 2013 could reduce the equity contributions 
among member states. However, this effect could be diminished by the 
decision to redistribute 10% of states’ emissions licences with the highest 
GDP per capita to those with a lower GDP per capita.  
Finally, today this revenue already exists and is allocated to national 
budgets. Its redirection to the EU budget should not create excessive 
administrative costs, but it will of course engender fierce political 
resistance. 
EU charge related to air transport  
This concerns the imposition of a charge on air freight and passenger 
transport operating in and/or leaving European air space. It is not a tax per 
passenger or a charge associated with the consumption of kerosene, but a 
charge calculated per flight depending on mileage. In its proposal the 
Commission is considering the possibility of the charge also depending on 
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According to Commission estimates, a €1 charge per kilometre would 
have allowed for €12.8 billion to be collected in 2006. The forecast growth in 
air travel resulting from the liberalisation of this sector strengthens the 
correlation of such a resource with the sufficiency criterion.  
Due to the expected growth in air transport, own resources based on 
an air fee would also provide a sufficiently stable income.  
This fee applies to air passengers and users of air freight services and, 
given the projected expansion of air transport in the future, it should reach 
an increasing number of users. The amount being small (a few euros) and 
specified on the invoice, passengers would be informed of the contribution 
they are making to the Community budget and would be able to see for 
themselves that it only forms a small amount in relation to the total cost of 
their ticket.  
Applied to all flights from the European Union, set at a very low 
amount and distributed equally between users, such a tax should not 
distort competition. Moreover, such a tax would serve many EU purposes, 
such as the fight against pollution, and lower distortion of competition in 
the transport sector.24 
While it has become more affordable in recent years, air transport is 
mainly used by consumers with higher incomes. This means that taxation 
on air transport should correspond to the vertical equity criterion. A tax on 
air transport would also be in line with the criterion of horizontal equity if 
the same aviation charge is applied on the whole EU territory. 
On the contrary, the correlation between this tax and the equity 
contributions criterion is low. In fact, the number of passengers and flights 
by country depends on a number of parameters that do not necessarily 
coincide with the wealth level of member states. These include: the role of 
tourism (Spain, Greece and Portugal for instance), geographical location 
which can justify higher air flow (the Netherlands, Great Britain and 
Germany) and the number of airports (France, Germany, Italy, Finland and 
Sweden).25 
Last but not least, such a fee would automatically apply to each 
ticket. According to the Commission, Eurocontrol could become 
responsible for the collection of the fee, meaning that, among other benefits, 
the administrative costs relating to this would be very low.  
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EU VAT rate 
The proposal of the European Commission is for the VAT rate to include a 
national and a European rate. The European rate would be determined by 
the decision on own resources and/or its rules of implementation, while 
the national rate would remain the exclusive right of each member state. 
The European VAT rate would be specified on each receipt/invoice, along 
with the national rate, so that each European citizen is duly informed of his 
or her contribution to the EU budget.  
A European VAT rate would provide a significant resource to the EU 
budget. The Commission estimates that a 1% VAT rate, combined with the 
abolition of the current VAT resource and not applied to products currently 
exempt from VAT, could fund almost half the current EU budget. 
A European VAT rate should also provide a relatively stable source 
of funding for the Community budget. A consumption tax would at least 
be more stable than a contribution based on GDP, subject to economic 
fluctuations (trade balance, level of and return on investment, economic 
growth, etc.).  
Another advantage of a European VAT rate is its visibility to the 
citizens. The idea is to apply a European rate on VAT separate from the 
national VAT rate and differentiate these two rates on the bills. All 
European citizens would then have a clear idea of their contribution to 
financing for the European Union. This neither allows for national 
contribution based on GDP, nor for the current VAT statistics resource.  
Resource allocation efficiency is questionable as far as the European 
VAT rate is concerned. On the one hand, VAT is directly related to the 
internal market and its development. On the other hand, the rate should be 
low and VAT applies to the vast majority of consumer goods. 
Harmonisation of the VAT rate in Europe would erase the differences 
currently prevailing between member states (such as the question of zero-
rated goods).  
The vertical equity of a European VAT rate has often been questioned 
since the poorest consumers devote a larger part of their income to 
consumption, and therefore have a higher VAT base. However, this 
assertion does not seem to have been proven. In fact, according to data 
provided by Eurostat (see Table A2 in the Annex to this chapter), countries 
with the highest VAT revenue as a proportion of GDP include both rich 
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(Bulgaria, Cyprus). The same applies to countries with low VAT revenue as 
a proportion of GDP: Spain, the Cohesion Fund beneficiary vis-à-vis Italy, 
with per capita GDP above the EU average.  
The best way to ensure the respect of the horizontal equity of an EU 
VAT would be to harmonise the VAT base across Europe. The question of 
zero-rated goods would also need to be addressed in that perspective. 
Also based on Table A2, if we compare the VAT rate as a percentage 
of GDP, there is a 6-point gap between the lowest (Spain: 5.1%) and highest 
(Cyprus: 11.1%) VAT rate. Nevertheless, this difference is moderated by the 
fact that only 3 out of 27 member states exceed the 10% rate: Bulgaria, 
Denmark and Cyprus. The vast majority of member states are in the 6.5-
9.2% rate, which represents a smaller gap. However, one has to be 
extremely cautious when quoting these figures because the local 
consumption of tourists (which is high in countries such as Cyprus, Malta 
and Ireland, for instance) is part of the harmonised base while, in reality, 
only the consumption of the country's residents should be taken into 
account. 
As VAT already exists, the creation and emergence of a European rate 
should not lead to additional collection costs likely to challenge the 
establishment of a European VAT rate. Moreover, the computer tool would 
easily allow for the implementation of the declaration method.  
EU tax on transport (energy related to transport)  
In the technical annex to its budget review, the Commission also discusses 
the possibility of redirecting the revenues from existing taxes on energy 
consumption, in particular on motor fuel, as a new own resource. As far as 
the Commission is concerned, not all of these taxes would necessarily have 
to be transferred to the EU budget; just a part of them could well be 
enough.  
The high rate of car ownership in the European Union (See Table A3) 
suggests that a tax on transportation energy would provide sufficient 
income to cover a significant part of the EU budget. According to 
Commission estimates, a fee of €330 per 1000 litres of fuel would provide 
an annual income of €109.8 billion. 
In addition, a tax on the amount of energy consumed in 
transportation is sufficiently stable and also a lot more stable than a tax 
based on the price of the energy in question.  40 | FINANCING THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Moreover, such a tax can be regarded as sufficiently visible, given the 
high sensitivity of public opinion in relation to energy prices, as well as 
issues related to pollution. Its implementation, through harmonisation, 
should also be simple as such taxes are already in place in member states.  
Such a tax would also contribute to a number of EU policies, such as 
the internal market, energy policy, transport policy and environmental 
policy. What is more, bearing in mind that a large part of CO2 emissions 
comes from transport, such a tax would help meet the EU objective to 
reduce CO2 emissions.  
Table A3, in the annex, demonstrates the correlation between per 
capita GDP and the number of cars per 1000 inhabitants for 21 out of 27 
member states. A tax on energy transport therefore meets the vertical 
equity criterion. To ensure horizontal equity of an EU energy transport tax, 
it would be necessary to ensure the harmonisation of such a levy. 
Table A4 reveals that, at present, there is a great disparity between 
member states as regards the share of transport-related environmental 
taxes in the GDP (an average of 0.55% for the whole of the EU, the smallest 
ratio prevailing in the Czech Republic with 0.16%, the largest one 
prevailing in Denmark with 1.85%). But as the part to be sent to the EU 
budget would be the same for every country, this should not constitute a 
handicap. 
A tax on transportation energy should also be relatively easy to 
implement, and the cost of the implementation would be very low. The 
Commission for example underlines that the implementation of this option 
would be simple and facilitated by the fact that such a tax already exists 
with a high level of harmonisation.  
EU corporate income tax  
The idea put forward here is to establish a common taxation for corporations 
retaining a uniform and relatively low product rate to be transferred to the 
EU budget. Even though the concept of a European corporate income tax 
dates from the early 1960s, it has never come to fruition, testifying to the 
complexity of such  a project. The main obstacles identified are the 
difficulties faced with regard to the harmonisation of the different national 
systems, as well as the reluctance shown by member states when it comes 
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According to the European Commission, corporate income tax 
represents some 2–3% of the EU GDP, and would therefore provide 
sufficient income for the EU budget even with a low rate. But, given the 
high sensitivity of this tax to fluctuations of the economy, it is not certain 
that the stability of this resource will be guaranteed.  
In terms of visibility, one could imagine a system similar to that of an 
EU VAT rate: the EU corporate income tax rate would be differentiated 
from the national rate on the company’s tax statement. The amount 
transferred to the EU budget would therefore be clearly marked. However, 
corporate income tax visibility remains low because it only affects 
businesses, and its implementation is not simple. The fact that this issue has 
been under debate within the EU since 1962, in vain, provides proof of this.  
The establishment of an EU corporate income tax could eliminate 
barriers to the development of cross-border economic activities (mergers 
and acquisitions) and thus enhance the operation of the internal market.  
EU corporate income tax by nature meets the vertical equity criterion 
as tax is imposed on corporations in proportion to their turnover. A 
common EU rate would ensure that the criterion of horizontal equity is 
respected. This would be even more the case if the call for progress towards 
a ‘common consolidated corporate tax rate, enshrined in the Pact for the 
Euro at the European Council of 11 March 2011, were to be implemented. 
The amounts that could potentially be collected as EU corporate 
income tax would not necessarily reflect economic development in the state 
in which the contribution is made, because of the openness of the economy 
and the possible correlation between the ratio of multinationals and the 
geographical impact of an EU corporate income tax.  
As regards administrative costs, the harmonisation of corporate 
income tax at the European level, and the replacement of the 27 existing 
systems with one single system (a rate and form common to the whole of 
the EU), should help to significantly reduce administrative costs relating to 
the waiver of such tax and to make things easier for European companies. 
The advances being made in relation to management and accounting 
suggest that the collection and transfer of an EU corporate income tax 
should not result in excessive administrative costs. The French-German 
proposals to unify the base of the corporate income tax as part of the Pact 
for Competitiveness should help to reduce the administrative costs. 42 | FINANCING THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Conclusion  
Table 3. Summary of correlation between the Commission’s proposals and the 8 
assessment criteria  
 Tax  on  the 
financial 
sector  
EU revenues from 















income tax  
Sufficiency   ••  •••  ••  •••  •••  ••• 
Stability   •  ••  ••  •••  •••  • 
Visibility and 
simplicity  




• •••  •••  ••  •••  ••• 
Vertical 
equity  
••• --  •••  •••  ••  ••• 
Horizontal 
equity 
••• •••  •••  ••  ••  •• 
Fair 
contributions  
•• •• •••  ••  •••  • 
Low 
administrati
ve costs  
•• ••• •••  •••  •••  •• 
Legend: •••: strong correlation/ ••: average correlation/•: low correlation/ --: no 
correlation. 
3.2  Proposal for a radical change of the EU financing system 
The above analysis and summary Table 3 show that while none of the own 
resources options fully meets all seven chosen criteria, some stand out, in 
particular because of their visibility to the individual citizen, their 
simplicity, their stability, or indeed their link with the political objectives 
Europe has set itself. 
It is quite clear that the choice of a one, or more, new own resource 
around which reform of the European Union financing system could be 
built, will also largely depend on criteria of a political nature, particularly 
since any decision on European Union own resources requires unanimity 
within the Council. EUROPE FOR GROWTH | 43 
The aim of reforming the Community own resources system must be 
to end national contributions, that is to say to produce an autonomous 
financing system for the Community budget. 
It is possible to imagine that ultimately by 2020, after a transition 
period, European Union financing will no longer rely on national 
contributions but will be based entirely on own resources. How? By 
transforming the current VAT resource into a genuine European VAT, 
while introducing another own resource in parallel.  
Increasing existing resources: Towards a genuine European VAT 
As the above analysis shows, VAT performs very favourably against many 
evaluation criteria. That makes European VAT the principal option around 
which reform of the Community financing system could be structured. 
The idea put forward by the Commission, and recommended by 
many experts, to apply a national rate and a European rate, would allow an 
end to the current statistical method, which makes the VAT resource 
resemble an additional national contribution, accentuating the issue of fair 
return.  
In fact, while the VAT resource calculation follows a complicated 
method, which consists of applying a given rate26 to a base determined in a 
uniform manner,27 the interest of the declaration method is preferable in 
many respects. Under the declaration method, any invoice issued to the 
final consumer must mention two percentages: the national percentage and 
the European percentage. This gives a national VAT total and a European 
VAT total, with the member state VAT administrations having to pay the 
latter to the European Union, but revenues from European VAT would not 
transit via national budgets. 
This method is extremely precise, simple and highly visible to 
European citizens. It could allow a very substantial amount of revenue to 
be collected. In fact, without increasing the size of the current budget, and 
based on the data shown in Table A2 on VAT and private consumption, a 
European VAT rate of 1% could be expected to produce income of €50-70 
billion a year, financing around half of the Community budget.28 
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28 This estimate is based on the EU GDP in 2008 (€12 ,495 billion, Eurostat figure) 
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The introduction of European VAT could be appropriately supported 
by strengthening VAT bases harmonisation in Europe. This is, moreover, 
one of the major projects currently being undertaken by the Commission, 
which has initiated a wide public consultation on the subject by publishing 
a 2010 Green Paper on the future of VAT.29  
As explained above, the VAT fully respects the principle of equal 
treatment of equal citizens. The VAT is not regressive. Indeed, for instance, 
the three biggest countries (Germany, United Kingdom and France) all 
have a GDP per inhabitant higher than the EU average and make up half of 
the total GDP of the 27, but their share in the total EU 27 consumption is 3 
percentage points higher. 
Lastly, the introduction of a European VAT rate should not lead to an 
increase in the VAT rate generally, since the revenue generated by 
European VAT may be deducted from national GDP-based contributions to 
the Community budget. 
For all of the above reasons, the revised VAT resource, as proposed 
by the Commission, would be an excellent instrument around which to 
base reform of the EU’s own resources system. It would not lead to an 
additional tax burden on European citizens, would improve visibility and 
understanding of European Union financing and would greatly simplify 
the own resources system. 
On pragmatic grounds, it seems reasonable to envisage a rate of 1%, 
which would allow a substantial reduction (approximately by half) in the 
burden currently imposed by GDP-based national contributions.  
Options for an own resource to complement the VAT resource 
For reasons linked to ease of implementation, and also because of their 
correlation with the political agenda of the European Union, their visibility 
and their simplicity, we have been particularly attracted by the option of a 
European eco-tax eventually complemented by the tax on financial 
transactions. 
                                                                                                                                       
figure): 1% of VAT would produce revenues of €70 billion, if goods with a zero rate 
are not taken into consideration. As a reminder, the Community budget for 2011 is 
€126.5 billion in payments (€141.9 billion in commitments). 
29 Green Paper on the future of VAT: Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient 
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A European eco-tax: Arguments for an EU carbon tax 
A European tax on the environment would constitute an optimal tax from 
an economic point of view. In a study carried out for Notre Europe and 
entitled Funding the EU Budget with a Genuine Own Resource: The Case for a 
European Tax, Jacques Le Cacheux takes up and develops the Pigouvian 
model.  
A Pigouvian tax30 is a tax that aims to internalise the marginal social 
cost of economic activity, notably with regard to pollution. It seeks to 
integrate negative externalities into the market. The ‘polluter pays’ 
principle derives from this. A Pigouvian tax may, for example, be imposed 
on a type of industrial pollution to reintegrate the cost this pollution 
involves into the cost of production itself, firstly, to show externality to the 
economic agent more clearly, and, secondly, to generate income aimed at 
remedying the negative effects of the pollution. A carbon tax is an example 
of a Pigouvian tax, its application at EU level is justified by the fact that 
external effects (greenhouse effect) largely exceed the national framework. 
A true Pigouvian tax should cover all greenhouse emissions (or, at least, 
CO2 emissions). For this reason, a generalised carbon tax would be 
preferable to any partial tax, such as taxes on transport or auctioning of 
greenhouse gas emissions allowances (which taxes only a part of industrial 
emissions).  
The assignment to the EU budget of the auctioning under the scheme 
for greenhouse gas emissions allowance trading (EU ETS) might be useful 
and, in the end, justified, as climate change policy is an EU priority. But the 
revenues that could be raised according to the Commission's estimates (€20 
billion by 202031) have already been assigned to the national budgets, this 
assignment being the element which made possible an agreement on the 
EU ETS system (whose impact varies greatly from one country to another). 
For this reason the proposal of the Commission to assign to the EU budget 
the revenue raised from the EU ETS, while extremely interesting, does not 
seem realistic. 
So, a genuine (and generalised) carbon tax appears to be the 
Pigouvian tax par excellence, and would also have the great advantage of 
promising considerable revenues. Today, the EU emits more or less 4 
                                                      
30 It takes its name from the British economist Arthur Pigou (1877–1959), who was 
the first to propose a tax correcting externalities in 1920. 
31 Estimates based on a price per emission permit set at €20.3 and auctioning of 
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billion tonnes of CO2. A tax of €20 per tonne of CO2 would raise in principle 
a total revenue of €80 billion a year, which would be more than necessary 
to feed the EU budget as a complement of an EU VAT revenue. 
In the technical annex joined to the Budget review, in the section 
related to the “EU energy tax” option, the Commission briefly refers to the 
possibility that existing taxes on energy consumption “could be replaced by 
an EU levy on energy/CO2 emissions”. Thus, the Commission seems not to 
exclude the carbon tax. But this option as such is not analysed in the 
Commission document. 
The carbon tax would be easy to implement. The consumption of 
fossil fuels being the sum of production plus imports, the implementation 
of such a tax would consist of taxing both the imports and the production 
of fuel, gas and coal. There are not many fossil fuel production and 
importation points (pipelines for gas, ports for fuel and for coal), so a 
system of control should not be too difficult to set up. 
This tax would have a different impact on the cost of the different 
kinds of fossil fuels, as shown in Table A6. The reason for this is that coal is 
totally transformable into CO2, which is not the case for gas or oil. 
Finally, a carbon tax should satisfy the criteria selected above: 
•  Sufficiency. Even at a moderate rate this tax could raise more or less 
0.5% of the EU GDP. 
•  Stability. Energy consumption is closely linked to the economic cycle. 
However this does not mean that this tax would be less stable than 
the current GNI contribution. 
•  Visibility and simplicity. This tax is very easy. Each fossil fuel is taxed 
according to its CO2 content. 
•  Low implementation cost. Imports and production data are easy to 
draw up. 
•  Efficient allocation of resources. This tax constitutes an ideal 
Pigouvian tax. 
•  Vertical equality. Two consumers producing the same emissions 
would pay (indirectly) the same tax. 
•  Horizontal equity. It should be respected as this carbon tax would be 
the same across the EU. 
•  Fair contributions. Generally speaking, energy consumption increases 
together with the revenue size. EUROPE FOR GROWTH | 47 
Tax on financial transactions 
Financial transaction volumes have increased dramatically in recent years, 
this increase being boosted due to our ability to process information more 
efficiently and in real time. The increase in trading on financial markets and 
the resulting volatility, with its destabilising consequences have been proof 
that those markets need steering and transparency. The current and severe 
financial and economic crisis is an illustration of those consequences. It 
seems that in terms of financial market activity perhaps ‘less’ is better for 
the overall economic stability. This applies in particular to those financial 
transactions that take place within the financial sector and thus represent a 
zero sum gain for consumers of financial services. 
Europe has been hit very hard by the crisis starting with the financial 
crisis in 2007, affecting the real economy in 2008 and finally affecting 
national budgets. The bail-outs and the stimulus programmes have led to a 
tremendous increase in public debt. The extreme pressure on national 
budgets has resulted in severe cutbacks in the public sector. It has also 
impacted the European budget, given the significant share of the GNI 
resource in the EU financing system. All the bail-outs of banks have been 
perceived as an unfair attempt to make citizens pay for the crisis, resulting 
in a momentum in public opinion for a taxation on the financial sector. For 
all these reasons, the financial transaction tax represents a serious 
candidate for a new EU own resource. 
Economic analysis distinguishes between a financial activity tax 
(FAT) and a financial transaction tax (FTT). The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) reached the conclusion that a FAT would be preferred, but this 
would be more difficult to use to finance the EU budget as this kind of tax 
would be levied on some part of the profit and loss account of financial 
institutions, which vary widely in terms of definitions across member 
states.  
A financial transaction tax could be an interesting complementary 
element in the field of European financial regulation. It could contribute to 
enhancing the efficiency and stability of financial markets and reducing 
their volatility as well as the harmful effects of excessive risk-taking, by 
dissuading them from carrying out certain risky activities. In that sense the 
financial transaction tax is also a Pigouvian tax as it could help internalise 
potential negative externalities of financial sector activities. 
A financial transaction tax could also be a significant revenue source. 
How much could be collected depends decisively on the exact definition of 
the tax, its base and the rate at which it is set. Some member states already 48 | FINANCING THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
have so-called ‘stamp duties’, which allow them to collect revenues that are 
significant at the member state level. The IMF and the Commission 
published studies with various options concerning the design of an FAT or 
FTT. With a rate set at 0.1%, an FTT applied only to exchange traded equity 
and bonds would generate €20 billion a year in the EU-27 according to the 
Communication of the Commission on taxation of the financial sector.32  
However, aside from all these positive comments, one must remain 
cautious as regards one question in particular. Indeed, although for some 
the EU should not wait for a decision on the world stage to implement an 
FTT, and should implement it on its own, on the other hand, many voices 
are more cautious, warning against the inherent risk of delocalisation of 
financial markets to other places not subject to taxation on financial 
transaction in case the FTT is not implemented on a world scale.  
An end to the various current forms of rebate and/or compensation and 
to end-of-year amending budgets 
Bringing to an end GNI-based national contributions and the financing of 
the Community budget solely by means of own resources will overturn the 
accounting logic of fair return and render obsolete not just the British 
rebate but also the other forms of compensation regarding Germany, 
Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands, which derive from the ‘British 
cheque’.  
An end to national contributions will also render obsolete the current 
practice that seeks, by means of an amending budget, to give member 
states the appropriations remaining unspent at the end of the financial 
year. The procedure followed today consists of reducing the GNI 
contribution of member states for the year N by the share of payment 
appropriations not used in year N-1 that is due to them. Once national 
contributions are abolished, this system becomes de facto obsolete. Unused 
appropriations will thus be transferred to the following year’s revenue, in 
this way constituting a supplementary own resource. On average, €4.9 
billion of unspent payments appropriations per year were given back to 
member states between 2005 and 2009.33 
                                                      
32 See COM (2010) 549. 
33 See Table A5 annexed to this chapter. EUROPE FOR GROWTH | 49 
Scenario for a reform 
Our scenario for reform of the EU own resources system is based on the 
budget 2011 figures, i.e. a budget of €126.5 billion in payment 
appropriations, as well as on the own resources candidates selected above: 
a genuine EU VAT, a carbon tax and eventually also a financial transaction 
tax. 
For existing resources, we take the system and the figures as they are 
in the 2011 budget. Concerning the new EU VAT, we set its rate at 1% and 
we assume that a collecting cost set at 5% is reasonable (it also corresponds 
to the initial rate set in 1970, when the VAT was first introduced as a 
resource to the EU budget). 
As regards the financial transaction tax, we propose to apply a rate of 
at least 0.05% on exchange-traded equity and bonds only, which according 
to Commission estimations would enable €10 billion a year to be raised. 
Concerning the carbon tax, CO2 emissions amount at present to 4 
billion tonnes in the EU27, of which 1.6 billion tonnes are already covered 
by the EU ETS, so that 2.4 billion tonnes remain available for taxation. Most 
experts consider that it will be necessary to set the price of a tonne of CO2 at 
least at €20 for the tax to have an impact. Consequently, the potential 
revenue that could be derived from an EU carbon tax is at least €48 billion. 
If a collection cost was to be applied to the carbon tax, a rate of 5% 
should be sufficient given that this tax could be levied at the point of entry 
(pipelines and tankers unloading in ports) or production (coal mines).34 Of 
course the aim of the EU is to reduce CO2 emissions by 20% as from 2020. 
This implies that the tax base would fall over time. But this could be 
compensated for by a corresponding increase in the tax rate per tonne, 
which would probably anyway be necessary to ensure that emissions do 
fall as projected under the 20/20/20 goals. 
                                                      
34 Fossil fuels importation entrance points are concentrated (pipelines and ports) 
and usually come in big units (large tankers, bulk freight ships). Hence collection 
costs should be smaller than for import duties. However, if member states decided 
in any event to apply the unrealistic rate of 25% for collection cost of the carbon 
tax, as they already do for import duties, the tax rate per tonne of CO2 should be 
increased accordingly. For instance, in order to raise €52 billion for the EU budget 
while having a collection cost of 25%, the price of the tonne of CO2 should be set at 
around €27 (compared to roughly €22 per tonne in the absence of a collection cost). 
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With a carbon tax, the need to impose stricter building costs and 
other regulation to achieve the planned reduction of emissions of 20% by 
2020 would be much reduced as home isolation and other energy savings 
measures would pay for themselves much more rapidly. A carbon tax 
would thus enable the EU to reduce the administrative burden on the 
economy of reaching the emissions reduction goals of the EU. 
With the abolition of the GNI resource, there is no longer any reason 
for unspent appropriations to be reimbursed to member states, so they 
should be entered in the budget (so that surpluses in one year can cover 
future shortfalls). Between 2005 and 2009, the annual average of unspent 
payments was of €4.9 billion, but we propose to set them at €3 billion, 
which represents the lowest amount in the period of reference. 
The reform of the current VAT resource into a genuine EU VAT, 
together with the introduction of one new resource, i.e. an EU carbon tax, 
would be sufficient to finance a budget of the size it has today, without 
having recourse anymore to the GNI resource. This is easy to implement in 
the short term and would provide stable revenues to the EU budget. 
Table 4. Genuine EU VAT + Carbon tax + End of GNI resource 
  € billion  
Existing own resources  18 
EU VAT (1%)  57 
 1%  of  consumption  60 
5% collecting cost  -3 
Carbon tax  48.5 
Unspent payments of previous year  3 
Total  
% of EU GNI 
126.5 
1.01 
Source: Own calculations. 
Once a financial transaction tax (FTT) has been introduced at the 
world level, then the financial transaction tax would become an additional 
own resource. The table below proposes a partial offsetting of the carbon 
tax by the financial transaction tax, but another possibility is that the FTT 
could, instead, replace the traditional own resources if the latter decrease in 
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Table 5. Genuine EU VAT + Carbon tax + End of GNI resource + Financial 
Transaction Tax 
 €  billion   
Existing own resources  18 
EU VAT (1%)  57 
  1 % of consumption  60 
5% collecting cost  -3 
Carbon tax  38.5 
Financial transaction tax (FTT)  10 
Unspent payments of previous year  3 
Total  
% of EU GNI 
126.5 
1.01 
Source: Own calculations. 
3.3  Conclusion 
In conclusion, revision of the European own resources system is today 
within reach, provided that the political will exists. Our proposal for 
reform is no more than a return to the spirit and the letter of the Treaty of 
Rome, which contained a clear aspiration for financial autonomy, applied 
until the end of the 1980s. 
Our calculations are that it would be possible to finance on a stable 
basis the current rate of expenditure of today's EU budget with a proper EU 
VAT (at 1%) plus one additional own resource like an EU carbon tax or also 
eventually a financial transaction tax (and keeping of course the existing 
own resources unchanged). The GNI resource could thus be abolished. 
Both the carbon tax and the financial transaction tax help internalise 
potential negative externalities of CO2 emissions and excessive financial 
sector activities. Both of them fit with two important EU political objectives: 
reduction of CO2 emissions and the regulation of the financial sector. 
As shown above, this reform would be as much in the interests of 
member states as of European citizens. Such a system would not add to the 
tax burden on European citizens and it would not undermine the fiscal 
sovereignty of the member states. It will help member states to cut their 
public expenditure. Financing of the Community budget would no longer 
place pressure on national public finances, making it possible to end the 
d e b a t e  o n  f a i r  r e t u r n  a n d ,  a t  t h e  same time, dispense with the various 
correction and rebate mechanisms. By doing so, EU financing will meet the 52 | FINANCING THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
degree of independence it needs to enable a debate on the revision of EU 
spending priorities to take place. 
Last but not least, the transparency, the simplicity and the visibility of 
such a system would increase the interest of the EU citizens in what they 
pay for and improve their link to the EU. Doing so will also participate in 
reducing the so-called ‘democratic deficit’. 
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Annex of Supplemental Tables 
Table A1. Number of air passengers in the European Union and number of airports 
per member state, 2008 
 Number  of  air 
passengers 







(€ at current 
prices) 
European Union (27 countries)  798,330,585    25,100 
Belgium 21,981,645  5  32,200 
Bulgaria 6,417,873  3  4,700 
Czech Republic  13,429,149  4  14,200 
Denmark 24,629,204  6  42,500 
Germany   166,095,390  75  30,200 
Estonia 1,804,430  7  12,000 
Ireland 30,018,287  9  40,500 
Greece 34,404,278  :  21,100 
Spain 161,400,952  40  23,900 
France 122,723,531  778  30,400 
Italy 105,216,903  44  26,200 
Cyprus 7,218,073  2  21,800 
Latvia 3,687,329  4  10,200 
Lithuania 2,552,074  3  9,600 
Luxembourg 1,713,003  :  81,200 
Hungary 8,429,082  3  10,600 
Malta 3,109,899  1  14,100 
Netherlands 50,418,517  5  36,300 
Austria 23,899,584  6  34,000 
Poland 18,727,132  10  9,500 
Portugal 25,180,382  10  16,200 
Romania 8,031,267  9  6,500 
Slovenia 1,648,977  3  18,400 
Slovakia 2,596,334  6  11,900 
Finland 14,850,682  29  34,800 
Sweden 27,817,350  32  36,000 
United Kingdom  213,888,122  55  29,600 
Source: Eurostat, January 2010. 
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Table A2. Private consumption and VAT (% of GDP, 2008), current prices 
  VAT/GDP Private 
consumption/ 
GDP 
Effective VAT rate on 
consumption (= VAT 
revenues/consumption) 
EU - 27  6.80  57.50  11.8 
EU - 16 (euro area)  6.60  56.60  11.7 
Belgium 6.90  51.90  13.3 
Bulgaria 10.80  66.40  16.3 
Czech Republic   6.90  49.70  13.9 
Denmark 10.10  48.30 20.9 
Germany 7.00  57.00  12.3 
Estonia 7.80  55.20  14.1 
Ireland 7.10  50.70  14.0 
Greece 7.00  74.50  9.4 
Spain 5.10  57.20  8.9 
France 6.90  57,00  12.1 
Italy 5.80  59.30  9.8 
Cyprus 11.10  68.60  16.2 
Latvia 6.50  62.90  10.3 
Lithuania 7.90  65.70 12.0 
Luxembourg 5.80  32.30  18.0 
Hungary 7.60  54.10  14.0 
Malta 7.70  63.00  12.2 
Netherlands 7.10  45.40  15.6 
Austria 7.60  52.30  14.5 
Poland 7.90  61.60  12.8 
Portugal 8.20  67.30  12.2 
Romania 7.80  64.90  12.0 
Slovenia 8.20  53.00  15.5 
Slovakia 6.80  57.10  11.9 
Finland 8.20  51.70  15.9 
Sweden 9.20  47.00  19.6 
United Kingdom  6.20  64.20  9.7 
Source: Eurostat, January 2010. EUROPE FOR GROWTH | 55 




(€ at current price) 
European Union (27 countries)  466  23,700 
Belgium 470  30,200 
Bulgaria 328  3,400 
Czech Republic  399  11,100 
Denmark 371  40,200 
Germany (including former GDR 
from 1991) 
566 28,200 
Estonia 413  10,000 
Ireland 412  41,600 
Greece 407  19,000 
Spain 464  22,300 
France 489  28,500 
Italy 597  25,200 
Cyprus 479  19,000 
Latvia 360  7,000 
Lithuania 470  7,100 
Luxembourg 656  71,800 
Hungary 293  8,900 
Malta 535  12,700 
Netherlands 442  33,100 
Austria 507  31,100 
Poland 351  7,100 
Portugal 405  15,100 
Romania 167  4,500 
Slovenia 488  15,500 
Slovakia 247  8,300 
Finland 475  31,500 
Sweden 461  35,000 
United Kingdom  471  32,200 
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Table A4. Environmental taxes in the EU linked to transport (% of GDP), 2008 
 
Environmental taxes linked 
to transport/GDP (%), 2008 
European Union (27 countries)  0.55 
Belgium 0.57 
Bulgaria 0.33 
Czech Republic  0.16 
Denmark 1.85 
























United Kingdom  0.54 
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Table A5. Unspent payment appropriations and reimbursed to member states  
( € billion)  
  2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Unspent payments calculated at end 
of year N (Amending 
Budget, end of year N) 
2.769 4.891 1.651 4.706  650 
Additional year N surplus 
(Amending budget, mid-year N+1) 
2.254 1.  810  1. 542  1.857 2.415 
Total unspent payments  5.023  6. 701  3.193 6.563 3.065 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
Table A6. Yield and price impact of a tax on CO2 content of fossil fuels at €20 per 
tonne of CO2 
  
Price per unit 
€without tax 
Total CO2 
tax, yield  
(€ billion) 




Oil (barrels)  70  34.9  7  10 
Gas (1000 m3)  240  19.8  43.2  18 
Coal (avg) (short t)  91  21.4  37.2  40.8 




4.  EUROPEAN PROJECT BONDS:  
AN ENGINE FOR GROWTH 
4.1  Introduction 
One of the most striking developments in the trend of public investments 
in the eurozone is its systematic decline during the last few decades. Figure 
2 illustrates the phenomenon. It shows how public investments in the seven 
eurozone countries (representing 81% of the eurozone’s GDP) declined 
from more than 3.5% of GDP in 1980 to less than 2.5% in 2010. The sharpest 
decline occurred during the 1990s when the eurozone countries were 
forced to follow the Maastricht convergence criteria, in particular the 
criterion of debt and deficit reductions. The eurozone countries were quite 
successful in achieving these fiscal criteria. This came at a price, however: 
many member countries dramatically cut back on investment.  
The contrast with developments in the US is striking. From less than 
2.5% of GDP in 1980, US public investment increased to 3.5% of GDP in 
2010. Note also the different reactions of the US and eurozone governments 
to the recent economic crisis. The former dramatically increased public 
investment, while the latter reduced them.  
The raging debt crisis in the eurozone is forcing many of its 
governments to initiate drastic programmes of austerity. This leads to the 
risk that, as during the 1990s, public investment will be the first victim of 
the budgetary axes. As shown in Figure 2, this process is already going on, 
leading to the danger that history will repeat itself.  
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Figure 2. Public investment in 7 eurozone countries (% of GDP) 
 
Note: Euro-7 = Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Finland. Public 
investment data for the other eurozone countries (in particular Spain) are only 
available since the mid-1990s. 
Source: European Commission, AMECO databank. 
 
4.2  Public investment: An engine for growth 
One of the most robust results from the theory and the empirical evidence 
of economic growth is that public investments are a very significant 
variable in boosting economic growth. This is the case both for public 
investment in infrastructure (physical capital) and in human capital (see 
Aschauer, 1990; Caselli, 2003). The reason why this is so is not difficult to 
understand. Public investment in infrastructure is essential for the efficient 
production of private goods and services. Thus, a good infrastructure 
(roads, bridges, railroads, airports, etc.) increases the productivity of the 
private sector and boosts economic growth. Similarly, investment in human 
capital (education) increases the skill and the knowledge of private sector 
workers, thereby boosting productivity. A large part of human capital 
generates collective benefits, i.e. benefits that accrue not only to the 
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decision to cut back on public investment that has contributed to the fact 
that the eurozone has developed into a low-growth union.  
How can these trends be reversed? It looks increasingly unlikely that 
the eurozone member countries will start boosting public investment 
programmes. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, it is more likely that they will 
continue to cut back on public investment. The trend can be reversed, 
however, by initiating programmes of public investment financed by 
issuing Eurobonds. We discuss how this can be done in the next sections. 
We start out by giving a taxonomy of Eurobonds. 
4.3  Eurobonds: A taxonomy 
It is useful to make a distinction between different types of Eurobonds by 
introducing two different dimensions. The first dimension is the purpose of 
the bond; the second dimension is the method of issuing the bond. We 
represent this in the following Table 6. The horizontal dimension focuses 
on the purpose of the bond, which can be to finance investment projects 
that boost economic growth or to finance government budget deficits. The 
former can conveniently be called ‘project bonds’, the latter ‘budget bonds’. 
The vertical dimension focuses on how the bonds are issued. These can be 
issued by public institutions or by private ones. 
Table 6. Eurobonds, EIB bonds, project bonds 
  Bonds issued by EU 
(or euro area) 
institution 
Bonds issued by  
private sector 
Bonds for financing 
investment projects 
• EIB bonds 
• Delors bonds 
 
• Project bonds 
(proposed by President 
Barroso in “State of Union” 
speech, 07.09.10) 
Bonds for budget  
purposes 




In the following we will concentrate on project bonds, i.e. Eurobonds 
that aim at financing investment projects. This is not to say that the budget 
Eurobonds aimed at solving eurozone countries budgetary problems are 
unimportant. They are, however, outside the scope of the present analysis. 
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4.4  Euro project bonds: A proposal 
We have noted that during the last three decades the public investment 
ratio in the eurozone has declined by more than 1% of GDP. This trend has 
contributed significantly to making the eurozone a low-growth area. This 
trend should be reversed. This can be done by a new programme of project 
bond issues aimed at raising the public investment ratio in the eurozone by 
1% of GDP. Since the eurozone GDP amounts to approximately €10 trillion, 
this means that a new yearly Euro project bond issue of €100 billion aimed 
at financing public investment should be undertaken.  
In line with the public consultation on the Europe 2020 Project Bond 
Initiative, recently launched by the European Commission,35 our proposal 
is to make the EIB the agent of this new Euro-Project Bond issue. As argued 
earlier, the expertise of the EIB in channelling funding into productive 
investments is strong. There is no need to create new European institutions 
to replicate what the EIB is doing. In addition the EIB enjoys a very strong 
AAA rating allowing it to attract funding at the best possible conditions. 
In order to maintain this favourable rating, the capital base of the EIB 
will have to increase. Today (2009) the EIB has a total balance sheet of €362 
billion, with shareholders’ equity of €38 billion. Thus its capital ratio 
amounts to 10.5%. Assuming an average five-year maturity of the EIB-
loans, an additional yearly public investment programme of €100 billion 
over time will increase the balance sheet of the EIB by €500 billion. This is 
more than a doubling of today’s balance sheet of the EIB. This will require 
an increase in the equity base of the EIB by approximately €52 billion, 
assuming that the EIB maintains a capital ratio of 10.5%. Thus the total 
equity commitment of the member states in the EIB over time will have to 
increase by €52 billion. This is a considerable amount, but this increase does 
not have to be realized at once. When spread over five years, it means that 
the new equity commitments must increase by €10 billion a year. This 
would not seem to create insurmountable problems.  
Another issue is whether the capital markets will be able to absorb 
such a new issue of Eurobonds. According to the BIS (2010), the total 
amount of outstanding bonds issued by developed countries was €25 
trillion in September 2010. Adding €100 billion does not seem to be much, 
considering also that during the last two years the net issue of new bonds 
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amounted to more than €2 trillion per year. In addition, the desire of many 
Asian investors to diversify their portfolio away from the dollar guarantees 
that there will be sufficient world demand for new Eurobond issues.  
There can be little doubt that a public investment programme of €100 
billion a year can easily be financed by the issue of Eurobonds. The 
obstacles to such a programme therefore are not technical or financial. They 
are only political. These obstacles can be overcome if sufficient political will 
can be generated in Europe to use the integration process as an instrument 
to boost economic growth.  
4.5  European project bonds: For what purpose? 
The need for financing infrastructure projects will increase in the coming 
years. Until 2020, the Commission evaluates these needs at an estimated 
total of around €1,800 billion: €500 billion for TEN-T, between €38-58 billion 
and €181-268 billion to achieve the Commission’s broadband targets and 
€1,100 billion for the energy sector (i.e. €400 billion for distribution 
networks and smart grids, €200 billion on transmission networks and 
storage and €500 billion to upgrade existing and build new generation 
capacity, particularly in renewable energy, between now and 2020).36 These 
calculations do not include the financing of big R&D investments such as 
ITER, for which the EU institutions are currently looking for an extra €1.3 
billion in addition to initial planning. 
Facing the economic and financial crisis, private investors are 
reluctant to fund infrastructure projects. At the same time, as a result of 
budgetary constraints, national governments are not in a position to fund 
such projects, and indeed are looking for alternative investment financing 
solutions. The general atmosphere of austerity does not offer optimistic 
prospects for an adequate increase of the financial envelope of the next 
multiannual financial framework. Last but not least, delaying these 
infrastructure projects might lead to higher-cost solutions in the future.37 
European projects bonds could thus be used to secure projects of key 
interest to the EU in transport, energy, information technology and 
research infrastructures. The issue of these bonds would also give a strong 
incentive to private investors to join in the funding of these major projects. 
                                                      
36 COM (2010) 700 final (Budget review). 




5.  EUROPEAN FINANCING IN TIMES OF 
AUSTERITY: THE BENEFITS OF THE 
‘EUROPEAN DIVIDEND’ AND BUDGETARY 
SIMPLIFICATION 
ome 20 European countries have been unable to adhere to the Stability 
and Growth Pact criteria. Several of them have a budget deficit higher 
than 10% of GDP, others a national debt that exceeds 100%. 
Throughout the Union, all public authorities have had to launch austerity 
plans on a scale not seen since the last World War. How, in this situation, 
will it be possible to finance the European policies that the Union requires, 
the new powers that it has been given by the Lisbon Treaty and, looking 
forward, the common ambitions in the 2020 Agenda? 
This unprecedented situation should give us the opportunity to tackle 
the question of the economies of scale that could result from better 
coordination between national and European budgets as well as from 
improved synergies. 
5.1  The freezing of the Community budget and its consequences 
The financing of European policies is at a dead end. Having failed to equip 
the Union with genuine own resources so far, the member states have 
condemned themselves to being its sole contributors as national budgets 
finance the biggest share of the European budget. As explained in previous 
chapters, this system is basically anti-Community as it obviously 
encourages each Finance Minister to demand a ‘fair return’ on the 
contribution of the member state he/she represents. As a result, the 
Community budget remains stuck at 1% of GDP. The national parliaments, 
for their part, are finding it increasingly difficult to understand why they 
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should raise their taxes or increase their country's debt to finance policies 
that are decided elsewhere without their consent. 
Yet, this is the very moment when Europe can no longer keep 
tightening its belt. In accordance with the Lisbon Treaty, a European 
External Action Service (EEAS) has been set up to conduct, a common 
European External Policy, under the authority of Catherine Ashton, EU 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs. This requires a minimum of 
administrative and operating appropriations. The Treaty of Lisbon also 
increases the Union's responsibilities in fields such as external relations, 
energy, space or the fight against climate change. But no additional 
financial means have yet been provided for these new competences. 
Moreover, there is a risk that key large-scale industrial programmes 
that were decided upon years ago, such as the Galileo satellite network and 
the world centre for fusion energy research (ITER), might be disrupted if no 
additional funding is found. 
Last but not least, the EU 2020 strategy, was recently decided by EU 
heads of state and government with the aim to foster EU growth and 
competitiveness. However, so far this political decision has not yet been 
financially translated into the EU budget. 
Nevertheless, in order to combat the crisis, governments can find the 
means of financing new policies decided at European level. In 2010 the 
European Council decided to allocate no less than €2.4 billion a year, from 
2010 onwards to helping developing countries combat the climate change. 
These sums will be mustered through contributions from each member 
state using an ad hoc allocation formula that differs from the normal 
Community scale. 
It is regularly asked, given that it is the national taxpayer who will 
have to pay, or act as guarantor, why bother going via the Union budget? 
Well, as this contribution aims to show, there is a very simple way to avoid 
calling on national budgets, and that is for Europe to be given some new 
own resources. 
The decision lies with the governments. If they prefer to rule out all 
new expenditure or all new taxes in their crisis exit strategies, the Union 
has no choice but to help apply these austerity measures; if, however, they 
consider it necessary to launch new budgetary initiatives, then the Union 
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One key consideration that is ultimately overlooked is the fact that 
the budget is the true instrument for measuring the spirit of solidarity. And 
the European budget is also a measure of the trust placed by its 
stakeholders in this joint venture, the societal bond or affectio societatis that 
unites the European family. To cap the EU budget is to cap faith in Europe, 
and to slam the brakes on solidarity between Europeans. The unedifying 
squabbles about the very principle of helping Greece or Ireland are a sad 
illustration of this unfortunate state of affairs. 
5.2  The interest of a common European approach for national 
budgets: The ‘European dividend’ 
The European dimension can help member states emerge from the crisis 
better equipped to balance and maximise the efficiency of their finances. 
All that is basically required is simply to apply the principle of 
subsidiarity in financial matters. Each time the Union exercises a power in 
the place of a member state, this should not only be done without imposing 
a new fiscal burden on the taxpayer but, all things being equal, it should 
also help reduce total expenditure. This is exactly what large industrial 
groups do: they pool common services to benefit from economies of scale. 
There are then two approaches to designing the Union’s new External 
Action Service, but a wide range of intermediate solutions exists between 
the options of creating a 28th diplomatic network and merging the existing 
27 national networks within a unified European service. Whilst it is 
understandable that all member states want to be represented in 
Washington or Beijing, the presence of four EU member state embassies, in 
addition to an EU embassy in Botswana, is at least three too many. The 
same applies to consular services, as the Schengen agreements and 
European treaties establish the principle of unlimited consular cooperation 
between member states. Member states employ at present 93,912 staff 
members in their foreign services (55,441 nationals plus about 38,471 in 
local staff). The diplomatic service of the United States corresponds to 
22,000 Americans and about 6,000 locals, for a total of about 28,000. 
Compared to these numbers, the EEAS, with its 3,700 employees, looks 
minuscule. But, on the contrary, compared to the US diplomatic service, the 
total staff employed in foreign affairs in the EU (at national and EU level) 
looks plethoric. In a very recent publication of the Centre for European 
Policy Studies, Emerson et al. (2011) make interesting calculations. They 
conclude: in the case of a moderate restructuring scenario, where national 
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doubled, this would represent a €227 million savings per annum (+€476 
million for the EEAS and - €753 million for the member states); and in the 
case of a substantial restructuring, which means a cut in national foreign 
services by 25% together with a multiplication by 3 of the EEAS, the net 
savings would be €329 million per year (+€950 million for the EEAS and - 
€1880 million for the member states). 
In the field of research, the Union allocates substantial funding of 
around €8 billion each year to a framework programme. On top of that, 
however, come national expenditures, the bulk of which are decided 
without knowing what one’s neighbouring countries are doing, leading to 
duplication and fruitless competition. With today 1.86% of its GDP 
dedicated to R&D expenditure, the EU is far from its target of 3% of GDP, 
and behind the United States (2.66%) and Japan (3.18%). 
The same applies to development aid. When the national budgets are 
added up, the figure produced is ten times that of the Community budget, 
which itself is duplicated by the intergovernmental budget of the European 
Development Fund. The EU is the biggest provider of development aid in 
the world (60% of the world development public assistance). However, the 
fragmentation of EU aid, between the EU development policy and the 
development policies of each EU member states, weakens the visibility and 
the weight of the total EU development effort. This fragmentation leads 
most of the time to duplication or, on the contrary, leaves some needs 
unmet. 
Even in a sector of deep political integration, such as the European 
monetary policy, the duplication of effort in the euro area’s central banking 
system entails an extra cost of around €3 to €4 billion a year in Europe. The 
12 national central banks of the countries that first adopted the euro still 
now employ together over 44,000 people (down from 53,000 in 1999). This 
compares to a total of less than 18,000 in all Federal Reserve banks in the 
US. The total expenditure of the national central banks in the eurosystem 
amounts to over €7.5 billion per annum, compared to less than half of that 
sum in the US Federal Reserve banks (equivalent to around €3.6 billion). 
Last but not least, the defence sector may be taboo, but it is an even 
more promising area for making savings. The risk of overlap between the 
European Union and NATO, which our American friends constantly go on 
about, should bring a wry smile compared to the scale of the redundancy 
that exists between our national armed forces. The 27 European armies 
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them are capable of carrying out a ‘high-intensity action’, as it is 
euphemistically known – i.e. fighting. How, in 2011, can we justify this pile 
up of disparate resources, the cost of which is disproportionate to their 
potential effectiveness which, in any case, will never be measured? The 
Afghan battlefield provides a cruel illustration of the true scale of 
comparative military capacity of all NATO members. 
5.3  The vast complexity of funding European policies 
Contrary to what people might think, the Union budget is far from being 
the only instrument for financing European policies and, by extension, 
actions related to common European objectives. In fact, in addition to the 
EU budget itself (€126 billion in 2011), there are no less than six additional 
categories of sources, each of which follows a different set of rules. 
Firstly, the European Development Fund (EDF) finances aid to ACP 
(African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries. It is an inter-state fund but is 
managed under the fairly close political control of the European 
Parliament. Everyone agrees that it should eventually come under the 
Community budget, but each time a new multiannual financial framework 
is negotiated, the European Council gives up on the idea. Moreover ACP 
countries are also not very keen on merging the EDF into the EU budget as 
this would impact their role in the management of the fund.  
Secondly, the decision of the European Council of 2010, mentioned 
above, of financing the aid promised to developing countries to combat 
climate change, has resulted in EU assistance to developing countries to 
combat climate change. However, unlike the European Development fund, 
this assistance is not currently a fund as such but only an agreement 
between the member states on the principle, the amount involved and the 
contributions by member states, without making use of the Community 
budget, without operating rules nor incentives for member states to ensure 
they will keep their promises. 
The third instrument is the official contribution by the member states 
to financing European policies or institutions. It encompasses broad and 
diverse areas: the national co-financing of Community programmes such as 
the structural funds, the cohesion policy, the research and development 
framework programme; national funding that supplements Community 
programmes or is supplemented by the latter (financing of the ESA space 
programmes, financing of most of the European Agencies, for example); 
and expenditures committed by the member states to actions that parallel 
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expenses are borne by the EU budget, whilst each member state remains 
responsible for its expenditure on military operations - in those cases, 
member states that participate in such operations pay twice over - in their 
national budget and in their contribution to the common budget). 
The fourth financing tool consists of the national expenditure 
contributing to the achievement of common European objectives. This is 
undoubtedly the largest category by size, but also the most difficult to pin 
down accurately. Common European objectives should be interpreted as 
areas in which the legal and financial competence basically remains in 
national hands, but in which the member states agree to assign themselves 
the same objectives. The Lisbon Strategy and now the EU 2020 strategy, the 
climate change and energy package the European Security Strategy are 
very good examples of this and arrangement. 
Identifying and quantifying this expenditure is very important for 
two reasons. First, faced with the extreme difficulties involved in increasing 
the European budget, it is the only way of verifying that these major 
objectives can be financed. Secondly, the proper use of these funds poses a 
problem in terms of democratic control, and thus for coordination between 
the national parliaments that use the funds and the European Parliament, 
which is responsible for monitoring the achievement of the objectives set. 
The fifth financial tool consists of loans of the European Investment 
Bank. These loans finance Community projects, often alongside European 
funds. The EIB is a unique institution which was created by the Treaty of 
Rome, but whose sole shareholders are the member states, and it is a 
powerful financer of investments decided in Brussels. Its role can only get 
stronger during a period of very poor budgetary performance. 
The last decided instrument of financing European policies, in 
addition to the EU budget, concerns the loans granted by some member 
states to others experiencing financial difficulties. 
On 9 May 2010, the Council agreed a package of measures worth up 
to €500 billion for a member state in difficulties or seriously threatened 
with severe difficulties caused by exceptional circumstances beyond its 
control. The package comprised: 
•  a European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism38 (EFSM) allowing 
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financial assistance to a member state in the form of a loan or credit 
line guaranteed by the EU budget, up to a total of €60 billion. 
•  a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) providing extra resources to euro 
area member states in the form of bilateral loans, up to a total of €440 
billion.  
The IMF will participate in financing arrangements for the SPV and is 
expected to provide at least half as much as the EU contribution, taking the 
total package to €750 billion.  
On 5 January 2011, the European Commission issued €5 billion of 
bonds in the framework of the EFSM, in order to finance the first financial 
assistance tranche for Ireland. This loan was contracted by the EU at a rate 
of interest of 2.59%. Ireland will reimburse it at a rate of 5.51%. This means 
that the mechanism is generating a revenue corresponding to the margin 
between the price of the EU loan and the price of reimbursement of this 
loan by the assisted country.  
This revenue should be entered into the EU budget as the latter acts 
as a guarantee of those loans, but the member states rejected this idea. In 
fact, not only did the member states insist that this revenue is to be entirely 
redistributed between them but also that it first be inserted into the budget 
before being transferred back to them. Instead, in our view, it should go 
straight to the EU budget, thus constituting another own resource. 
5.4  Conclusion 
To put it in a nutshell, these few examples give an idea of the potentialities 
of the financial economies of scale that the EU and its member states could 
benefit from with a simplification of the EU financial means, which today 
are dispersed in different instruments and/or formulas, as well as from 
better synergies between national and European policies and budgets.  
At this time of unprecedented crisis, characterised by the scarcity of 
financing resources, in combination with an urgent need to coordinate the 
EU member states’ recovery actions and to create the necessary incentives 
in favour of significant investments supporting economic growth, these are 
issues that cannot be ignored.  
Such economies, as well as the additional revenue that could be 
raised from the EFSM, could relieve part of the pressure on national public 
finances and would also make room to fund the EU’s newly arising needs 
in order to face the challenges of the future. In the end, the revenue and 
economies resulting from the ‘European dividend’ could represent some 
other kind of EU own resources of a non-negligible magnitude.  
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